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ABSTRACT

A profile of Chicanos on the basis of key indicators of socioeconomic and political status reveals remarkable gaps between them and the Anglo segment. Chicano incomes are much lower, their educational attainments are inferior, their occupational range is narrow and unfavorable, and their returns on educational attainments are lower. Finally, their access to policy making is negligible. These patterns of political, economic, and social exclusion are the result of the historical application of the mechanisms of internal colonialism. The intentional isolation of Chicanos in the public schools of both the rural and urban Southwest has been a pervasive feature of the region's educational systems for many decades. This educational segregation, whether de jure or de facto, is sustained by official policies and institutional arrangements. This paper outlines the public practices that limit desegregation efforts in communities with large Chicano populations and suggests which community types are most susceptible to attempts at integration. The paper also explores the historical and current consequences for Chicanos of their subordinate ethnic status, and their evolutionary role as a forcibly included population; examines present patterns of social, economic, and political marginality characteristic of Mexican American society; analyzes the mechanisms of internal colonialism; examines the population's adaptive responses to its status as an internal colony; and discusses future problems and implications for public policy. (Author/NQ)

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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE CHICANO COMMUNITY

Sheldon Rosen

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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE CHICANO

The intentional isolation of Chicanos[1] in the public schools of both the rural and urban Southwest has been a pervasive feature of the educational systems of that region for many decades. This educational segregation, whether de jure of de facto, is sustained by official policies and institutional arrangements. This report first outlines the public practices that limit desegregation efforts in communities with large Chicano populations and suggests which community types are most susceptible to attempts at integration. Then, in order to deal more adequately with the subject of desegregation, an analysis is made of the historical and present structural position of Chicanos within U.S. society. This situation of the Mexican-American population not only impedes desegregation attempts, but also perpetuates the subordinate status of Chicanos within the U.S. polity.

Ethnic Isolation in the Schools

Although legal segregation of Mexican-Americans in the schools of the Southwest was ended in the 1940's, inter-school segregation as well as intra-school segregation continues throughout the region (Grebler et al. 1970:170). Ethnic isolation is most serious in Texas and New Mexico where two-thirds of the Mexican-American students were attending predominately Chicano schools (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1971a:26). Even in California where the least serious situation of segregation prevails, a survey by the California State Department of Education (1967) showed that in eight large California school districts--those with 50,000 or

more children--almost 60 percent of the Spanish surname children attended Chicano dominated schools. In predominately Chicano schools, classes are larger and both facilities and teachers are deficient (Moore 1975:81). Reaffirming the accepted view that segregated facilities fail to offer equal educational opportunity, it has been found that where ethnic segregation increases, the Chicano educational level decreases (Salinas 1971; 949).

Within schools that are desegregated, institutional practices, such as ability grouping, still operate to isolate Chicano students. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1974b:21ff) found that separating students on the basis of ability was common in two thirds of Southwestern schools. Chicano youth are concentrated in low achievement groups and channeled, to a greater degree than Blacks and Anglos, toward vocational education (Mayeske 1967; D. E. Wright et al. 1973). Although it has been found detrimental to those placed in low ability groups, this practice is on the increase.

Public Policy and School Segregation

A combination of direct and indirect public policies and institutional arrangements at the federal, state, and local levels operates to exclude Chicanos from or within specific schools (Showell 1976:401). Governmental practices have isolated the Chicanos in the public schools and continue to promote exclusion by prohibiting efforts to enforce desegregation while helping to maintain residential segregation. Residential isolation, in turn, is "a substantial factor in the de facto school segregation of Mexican-Americans" (Salinas 1971:945).

Concentration of Chicanos in the public schools was de jure because it involved state action as well as regulation by school districts (Salinas 1971:940). Federal nondecision-making and nonregulation has been tantamount to support of persisting residential and educational segregation, allowing "states and their political subdivisions. . .to preserve their separatist arrangements" (Showell 1976:405). First, I will examine the actions of the Judicial, Legislative and Executive branches of the federal government which help maintain educational isolation, and then I will deal with residential separation.

The Courts, Congress and the Executive Branch

The courts, by 1976, have retreated to a position that separate and unequal facilities are legal. This is the result of three Supreme Court decisions: San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973); Milliken v. Bradley (1974); and Ross v. Eckels (1970). The Rodriguez case involved a suit on behalf of the Chicano inhabitants of a nearly 100 percent Mexican-American school district of San Antonio against the Texas system of financing public education in a school district by property tax assessments within that district. This practice has meant that the predominately Chicano schools are underfinanced relative to Anglo concentrated schools because the former must depend on the smaller tax base of a poorer population. While Chicanos make up nearly 50 percent of San Antonio's pupulation, of the 13 school districts in and around that city, 8 are mainly Anglo-American and 5 are mainly Chicano (Salinas 1971:949). The Supreme Court, in reversing the district court's decision that the Texas school financing system was discriminatory, held

that there is no compelling reason why educational opportunities must be equal in the Chicano concentrated city and the Anglo suburbs (Showell 1976:414).

Further dimming Chicano hopes for equal education is the Milliken decision which found that enforced integration, rather than involving cross district metropolitan area school desegregation, is applicable only within individual district boundaries (Gittel 1976:36). Thus there is little prospect of a desegregation plan that would enable the Chicano inhabitants of the mainly Mexican-American school districts of San Antonio to go to the better facilities in the Anglo neighborhoods.

Perhaps the greatest perversion of desegregation efforts has come in Ross v. Eckels. This decision held that the pairing of 27 predominately Black and Chicano schools in Houston largely fulfilled school "integration" requirements. Such mixing of Black and Chicano students was facilitated by high rates of residential segregation which isolate adjacent Black and Mexican-American neighborhoods from those of Anglos (Salinas 1971:949).

Like the courts, Congress has moved to restrain school integration since the late 1960's. The basic impulse of recent legislation has been "to prohibit judicial efforts to enforce the desegregation requirements of the Constitution. . .and to repeal the school desegregation requirements of the 1964 Civil Rights Act" (Showell 1976:406). For instance, Congress has forbid spending of Federal funds to support those educational institutions desegregating voluntarily or by court order and has limited the powers of the federal government in school desegregation matters (see Showell 1976 for more details).

Under present administration, the executive branch of government

initiated a carefully orchestrated program to end enforcement of the Civil Rights Act (Showell 1976:408). Not only have federal funds been cut back from a school system once it desegregates, but the Justice Department has become a legal opponent in civil rights and desegregation cases (Pettigrew 1975:143; Showell 1976:408).

Residential Segregation

The ultimate solution to school desegregation is the achievement of racial and ethnic balance in housing (see Gottlieb 1976; Rist 1976:246; C.S. Bullock 1976: 439ff). Yet public policies and institutional arrangements have perpetuated segregated living patterns. Prior to the 1948 Shelly v. Kramer decision, states in the Southwest enforced private racial convenants barring Chicano residents in predominantly Anglo areas. Currently Chicanos are denied access to homes and apartments in mainly Anglo areas by deliberate districting and zoning (Salinas 1971:945). State governments have pursued a policy of nondecision making in regard to such issues as zoning, allowing the segregation of the suburbs to proceed (Gittell 1976:41). While federal housing policies encourage white families to leave the central cities for the suburbs through tax incentives, federal housing programs have done little to crack housing barriers (Showell 1976:408).

Desegregation and Community Types

The best prospects for achieving stability in ethnic composition of desegregated public schools appear to be in rural districts not overwhelmingly Chicano and in those urban areas where the school district includes both the central city and suburbs of an entire metropolitan

area (W. L. Taylor et al. 1976:34). Rural whites, able to anticipate a stable racial composition, know that these ratios will not shift significantly (C. S. Bullock 1976:439). Only where the school district encompasses an entire metropolitan area can a school desegregation plan include both central city and suburban districts according to present judicial rulings.

Desegregation and Internal Colonialism

Institutional arrangements and public policy help perpetuate educational segregation. More significantly the denial of adequate education to Chicanos is only one facet of the overall economic, political, and social exclusion of Chicanos within American society. The Mexican-American population has been incorporated into U.S. society as an internal colony. By this I mean that Chicanos have been marked out as a sector of society that is available for exploitation, while, at the same time, they have been denied their legitimate share of public socioeconomic resources. As documented in the following pages, public policy and governmental institutions at all levels have been and remain firmly in the hands of the Anglo segment of society. As such Chicano needs and demands are ignored. The effectiveness of school desegregation efforts must be seen within a long history of racial discrimination and present institutional barriers which exclude Chicanos from all phases of life including higher level occupations and housing. I will proceed to analyze the historical and present structural situation of Chicano within the U.S. polity in order to clarify the limited nature of a policy devoted solely to educational desegregation and to point out the need for a much wider range of reforms.

INTERNAL COLONIALISM AND THE CHICANO POPULATION

The Chicano population is an internal colony of the U.S. While many of the needs and demands of the Mexican-American population go unanswered, Chicanos are part of the cheap labor force available to Anglo commercial establishments. The current subordinate status of Chicanos in the U.S. society is the legacy of war of conquest and continuous discriminatory policies. As an originally involuntary incorporated sector of U.S. society, the ethnically distinct Chicano community has historically found itself facing unconcerned policy-makers, and frequently exploited.

By analyzing Chicano society within the internal colonial framework, it should not be concluded that Chicanos form a homogeneous group. Though generally sharing a similar socio-political situation, the Chicano population is highly differentiated. Its communities spread from the industrial metropolises of the Midwest such as Chicago and Gary to the rural and semi-rural mining and farming areas of the Southwest, on to the large cities of the Pacific Coast. While the vast majority of the population is concentrated in the lower income brackets and has few specialized skills, there are some individuals who are highly trained and comparatively affluent in most communities. Yet, whenever they form a sizeable part of the population, Chicanos

> "have been regarded as casual, incidental workers, or as factory hands available for the laborer, service and operative jobs in the generally lower paying industries" (Schmidt 1970:2).

In cities as well as in rural areas, most Chicanos live in the poorest housing, work in the lowest unskilled positions and have only restricted access to education and other public service.

Originally incorporated into U.S. society as a conquered indigenous population, Chicanos have been readily identifiable as an ethnically distinct segment. Ethnic differentiation from Anglo society facilitated the application of the subordinance and dominance mechanisms of internal colonialism upon the subjugated population. Both geographical segregation and occupational stereotyping were used to isolate further Mexican-Americans, enabling Anglo commercial interests to use them as cheap labor inputs in the economic expansion of the Southwest. Chicanos were frozen out of the benefits of historically expansive employment opportunities by denying their communities a fair share of public services, and by excluding them from avenues of occupational advancement within the rapidly expanding industries.

In the first part of the following report, I explore the historical and current consequences for Chicanos of their subordinate ethnic status, and their evolutionary role as a forcibly included population. The immigration of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans who have become part of Chicano society must be explicitly analyzed within this framework. Although they came to the U.S. voluntarily, they were identified with the subordinate Chicano sector, have become part of the Chicano culture, and, coming with few resources, were earmarked for the unskilled and lowest brackets of employment.

The report then examines present patterns of social, economic, and political marginality characteristic of Mexican-American society. A

profile of Chicanos on the basis of key indicators of socioeconomic and political status reveals remarkable gaps between them and the Anglo segment. Chicano incomes are much lower; their educational attainments defined as years of schooling are inferior; their occupational range is narrow and unfavorable; their returns on educational attainments are lower. Finally, the Chicano population's access to policy making is negligible. This wide separation between Chicanos and the national society in dimensions of economic and political status remains upon moving from the rural Southwest to the urban centers of that region, or upon leaving the Southwest for the Midwest. Although Chicanos show great increase in indices such as income from the first to the second generation, their socioeconomic mobility appears to halt at the third generation, leaving them greatly deficient to Anglos.

These patterns of political, economic and social exclusion are the result of the historical application of the mechanisms of internal colonialism. These mechanisms are analyzed in the third part of the report. Prominent among them is the use of public policy, as well as the operation of governmental institutions. In this context, we examine the educational system and public policy concerning education, law enforcement agencies, welfare departments, the Immigration Service, immigration policy and agricultural policy, and manpower policy. In each case, we find that public policy and agency operation not only are inadequate to remedy the situation but actually act to perpetuate the subordinate status of the Chicano population.

The adaptive responses of the Chicano population to its status as an internal colony are examined in the fourth section. Chicanos have

acted as individuals and as members of ethnic organizations, both political and nonpolitical, in order to deal with their subordinate condition. Among the individual adaptive strategies are the use of additional income-bearing activities like welfare and the economy of crime in order to bolster poverty level wages. While erroneously thought of as a passive people, Chicanos throughout their history have engaged in frequent acts of active opposition to oppression by the greater society.

The final part of this report deals with future problems and implications for public policy. We assess the likelihood that Chicanos will escape their colonial status. The picture according to established historical trends and current socioeconomic indicators and projections does not look bright. Real incomes of Chicanos have dropped with the inflation of recent years. Unemployment and underemployment, among the young and young adults, is high so that the employment situation among the younger generation shows no sign of changing what has been the traditionally deficient Chicano occupational distribution: concentration in the worst and lowest paying positions, and joblessness. Programs to create jobs that are rewarding in terms of pay and opportunities to advance are needed. However, centers of decision-making lack Chicano representation and remain almost exclusively in the hands of the Anglo sector. Such centers most probably will not undertake the fundamental policy transformations that are needed to incorporate the Chicanos socioeconomically into the national society.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The major boundaries of the Chicano internal colony were established in the Southwest through the incorporation of Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Arizona, and California following the Mexican-American War of 1848. In the aftermath of the war and for years thereafter, Mexicans were singled out as a defeated people who were physically and culturally distinct. The salient fact in the history of Chicanos in the U.S. has been the perpetuation, through time, of the division between conqueror and conquered. The indigenous Mexican population of the Southwest, and subsequent waves of Mexican immigrants, were initially exposed through this act of inclusion to exploitation and economic exclusion from opportunities by commercially-oriented Anglo elites.

The particulars of the historical relationship between the two ethnic segments varied according to deomgraphic ratios between the two segments and to the extent of incorporation of particular areas into the national economy. These differences have resulted in much of the inter-regional variability that we see today.[2] Everywhere in the old Mexican territory some of the native upper class attempted to join the emergent ruling groups of the conquering society. Yet, in Texas and California, the original Mexican elite was almost totally excluded from political participation because of the swamping of the indigenous population by Anglo settlers who poured in when these regions entered the commercial life of the U.S. (McWilliams 1968:92).

In contrast, the transition from Mexican to U.S. rule for the Mexican upper class of New Mexico was one of much greater continuity as a result of nearly bloodless conquest, a numerically dominant indigenous population, and the relative isolation of the area. Here the strong native elite--the rico element--remained intact and was successful in sharing leadership with the emergent ruling class of Anglos (Moore 1970a:465-466). On the other hand, the situation was not as accommodating for the poor, los pobres.

> "The subordinate status of the pobres in relation to the ricos and their poverty, served to set them apart in a category that, in Anglo-American eyes, was roughly comparable to that of Indians" (McWilliams 1968:75).

Thus, while the attempt of the indigenous eliges to take part in Anglo society met with varying success, everywhere in the Southwest the poorer and illiterate Mexicans became subordinated as a distinct ethnic sector (Marden and Meyer 1973:307).

The Nature of the Ethnic Boundaries

The subjugated indigenous population of the Southwest was linguistically, racially and culturally unmistakable. The vast majority of the original Mexican inhabitants were of mixed Spanish and Indian ancestry. While Mexican-Americans were and are not a homogeneous group in appearance, many were and are identifiable by skin color and other physical characteristics. This conjunction of status as a forcibly included group and easily visible ethnic distinctions made it easier for the national society to perpetuate the division of society between conquerors and conquered. As Joan Moore observes:

> "European ethnics did not suffer such a heavy burden of differentiation by race. Nor were they associated with a conquered subordinate population. Racial differentiation and a subordinate status made it easier for the dominant-subordinant relationships to be institutionalized" (Moore 1975:143).

Ethnic boundaries, then, became isomorphous with the separation of society into those who had power and those who did not.

Derogatory stereotypes developed throughout the Southwest and helped establish, defire, and maintain the ethnic boundary from the dominant group's viewpoint. According to popular Anglo myth, the conquered Mexican-Americans were an inferior species of human being. They were contemptuously referred to by such uncomplimentary terms as "greasers," and depicted as cruel yet submissive and cowardly, backward, emotional and nonmotivated. Such cahracterizations endured for a long time and continue to exist and influence public policy. For example, the Los Angeles sheriff's "Bureau of Foreign Relations" justified its sweeping raids in the Chicano barrios in 1942 by officially reporting that the Chicanos "desire to kill, or at least let blood"was an "inborn characteristic" (quoted by Steiner 1970:233). Mexican-Americans developed their own stereotypes in self-defense, referring disdainfully to Anglos as Gringos.

Internal Colonialism, Ethnicity, and Inter-Ethnic Relations

Chicano society's position as an involuntarily incorporated group and its ethnic distinction set the foundations for the structural mechanisms of internal colonialism. The economic dimensions of this situation became operative whenever economic activity brought the two

sectors into competition or opened the need for a cheap labor force. The maintenance of ethnic boundaries from the national society point of view enabled Anglos to utilize Chicanos to obtain inputs for their economic enterprises at lower costs while denying the Chicago population its proportinate or reasonable share of the benefits. By marking them out as a subjugated population, Anglos could take Chicano-owned land with impunity, and employ the Chicanos in the most menial occupations for less pay. In this sense, it is possible to view many aspects of internal colonialism as a specific type of inter-ethnic relationship.

All through the Southwest, the commercial incorporation of a given region into the national society resulted in the introduction and application of the mechanisms of internal colonialism. In Northern California, for example, within a few years of the Gold Rush of 1848-1849 the economic power of the Chicanos was destroyed. The situation in Texas was no less dramatic. After annexation, land speculators in Texas bought up land confiscated for unpaid taxes (Marden and Meyer 1973:308). In New Mexico, which remained relatively isolated until 1900, new railroads eventually opened the area to Anglo mining, ranching and transportation interests, accelerating the consolidation of ranches and destroying the small Chicano landholders, and the economic base of rural Chicano towns (Moore 1970b:16; Lopez y Rivas 1973:30). Knowlton (1973) details the many methods that Anglos used to divest Mexican-Americans of their land in New Mexico.

Language differences, part of the boundary between the two ethnic segments, obstructed Chicano efforts to protect themselves. The administrative and legal systems were run in English, making it difficult for

the Chicano to participate in the national society; in many cases lack of knowledge about laws and customs resulted in even greater marginalization (Lopez y Rivas 1973:31-32). The use of an official language as a mechanism to isolate the Chicano from U.S. institutions has continued to the present inhibiting articulation of Chicano political demands.

By the early twentieth century, the Chicano population in the Southwest was politically and economically impotent. Thus, despite regional variations, the process remained the same:

> "The very forces that spelled economic opportunity for large Anglo enterprises were forcing a considerable proportion of Mexicans into the status of a dependent minority" (Moore 1975:16).

The dependency of the Mexican population was beneficial for commercial interests. It was the availability of cheap Mexican labor, in fact, that led to the "birth of the Southwest as an economic power" (McWilliams 1968:163). Employers could more easily exploit Chicanos because of their highly visible physical appearance and other ethnic characteristics. Gordon hypothesizes that starting around 1870 it became useful for employers to forge a highly stratified labor market in order to fill secondary jobs (the worst and lowest paying), while at the same time developing a permanent group of skilled workers to occupy the positions that were being created by the expansion of technology (Gordon 1972:72-73). Employers did this by filling the worst jobs with the non-white minorities whose racial and ethnic characteristics could hardly be disguised and whose discrimination was tolerated by society (Gordon 1972:74-78).

Eager to reduce their costs to a minimum, employers fostered the further isolation of the Chicano population by occupationally stereotyping

them and separating them geographically. As the economy of the Southwest expanded with the introduction of irrigation in 1902, Mexican-Americans were concentrated in those industries which were vital to the economic growth of the Southwest: the mines, the railroads, and irrigated labor intensive farming. Chicanos were a majority of the mine workers (Lopez y Rivas 1973:34). In the principal Southwestern railroad lines, Mexicans made up most of the section crews and extra gangs. Likewise, Mexicans played a major role in the production and harvesting of every single crop "in the growth of commercial fruit and vegetable production in the Southwest between 1900 and 1940" (McWilliams 1968:177).

The economic development of the Southwest, then, was based on the use of Mexican labor; but, rather than benefitting this group, led to their further marginalization. McWilliams describes the process of exploitation as it operated on a population distinguished by culture and occupation:

> "To keep Mexicans earmarked for exclusive employment in lowest brackets of employment, their employers have set them apart from other employees in separate camps in company towns, and in segregated colonies (ibid:216).

Separate schools were established and civic conveniences were minimized in the satellite communities. Thus, geographic isolation was added to ethnic isolation in marking out a population for utilization and for differential allocation of public benefits.

Although Chicano labor was perhaps the major factor in the commercial expansion of the Southwest, Chicanos reaped a bitter harvest. Desired as a cheap work force, they were pushed by hiring practices into the most limiting jobs--those that were seasonal or casual, provided no

opportunities for advancement and were undesirable by location, such as unskilled labor in desert mines and cement plants (McWilliams 1968:215). Large employers pursued a deliberate policy of geographically segregating Mexicans to hold them to these limited occupational categories (ibid:187). Chicano children were purposefully given deficient education in order to keep them "in their place" (see Taylor 1930; Garcia 1975).

The historical record demonstrates that racial and cultural stereotypes not only form part of an overbearing ethnic boundary which affects Chicano society, but also serve as a justification for continued exploitation. For example, in hearings before the Texas Industrial Welfare Commission in 1919 in El Paso, Anglo business men explained that they paid their Mexican laundry and factory workerd less pay for the same work because Mexican racial and cultural disadvantages prevented them from producing as much as Anglos (Garcia 1975:202). Ruth Tuck (1956: 5354) notes that the Anglo inhabitants of San Bernadino, California, argued that the low-status Mexicans were getting what they deserved: "Born inferior, generation after generation, the Mexicans would never be able to advance themselves."

Both racially and culturally different, Chicanos could not readily alter their visibility as a distinct group. Along with a subordinate status inherited from the conquest, easily-apparent ethnic traits enabled the national society to single them out for selective utilization in the economy. This historical process of forcing Chicanos to occupy the lowest-paid and dead-end positions and of eliminating their control of productive resources, such as land, parallels and has resulted in many of the present problems of this population--massive unemployment

and underemployment, and concentration in menial jobs without advancement (Griswold del Castillo 1975; Arroyo 1975; Garcia 1975).

Ethnic Identity and Behavior of the Colonized

Internal colonialism not only results in economic, social, and political marginality, but its many dimemsions also place severe limits upon the lifestyle, aspirations, and motivaitons of individual Chicanos. Stigmatized as an ethnically inferior group, members of the subordinate segment have found that their efforts to gain access to resources fail. Others have joined the Anglo sector by divesting themselves of their ethnic identity and loosening their ties with their old communities.

Chicanos have not been able to escape the fact that they are regarded as a racial minority. Although the native-born of native-born parents may seek to distinguish themselves from newer immagrants by referring to themselves as Spanish-Americans or native Californians, Anglos still consider both longtime residents and newcomers as one group. Impotence and insult are often the result:

> "I think like an Anglo and I act like an Anglo but I'll never look like an Anglo. Just looking at me no one could tell if I am an American or one of those blasted Mexicans from across the river" (A South Texas Chicano as quoted by Madsen 1964:8).

Finding that their hard work goes unrewarded leads to frustration as voiced by a young Spanish-surname professor of Mexican descent:

> "You know very well I could be president of this university, and to 90 percent of the Anglos of the country, I would still be a 'spik,' 'dirty Mex'" (Quoted by Steiner 1970:175).

In order to escape indignities and to manage individual gain, some Mexican-

Americans have Anglicized. Those few who earn more money tend to disappear into the Anglo sector, leaving their Spanish names, Mexican accents and identity as Chicano behind. But in doing so they become alienated and marginal men, held in contempt and envy by those who stay behind, while not fully accepted in the Anglo communities (Steiner 1970:175-177).

Ultimately, most members of Chicano society suffer psychologically. Those that pass into Anglo society must give up their roots. Those remaining experience the frustration of seeing their hardest efforts unable to break the wall of discrimination. For the most oppressed segments of the Chicano population, a sense of stoicism may result. Among the politically aware, a sense of alienation prevails.

Immigration

Although a small Mexican indigenous population inhabited the Southwest at the time of the war of conquest in 1848, most of the ancestors of today's Chicanos have entered the U.S.from Mexico as immigrants. A number of factors make both Mexican immigration and the Chicano experience in the U.S. different from that of other ethnic groups. Immigrants from Mexico, perceived as having the same ethnic characteristics as a group previously conquered and at present in a subordinate position were themselved easily stereotyped and exploited. In Carey McWilliams words:

> "The new immigrants were . . . fitted into the mold of subordination which had previously crystallized in the borderlands" (1968:189).

Considered a separate racial group by the Anglos of the Southwest, Mexican immigrants were believed inferior to Central and Southern European immigrants. In addition, the entering Mexicans were invariably illiterate

and poverty stricken which meant that they fit in at the bottom of the subjugated sector.

Mexican immigration to the U.S. remains distinct from that of other ethnic groups in that the proximity of a permeable 1,800 mile border has meant that Mexicans find it easy to return to their native country, and to enter the U.S. in a great many different ways. The closeness of Mexico, a country whose economic problems include great poverty and unemployment, has made for a steady stream of both legal and illegal entrants eager to earn a better living in the U.S.

Chicanos retain their language more stubbornly than other major ethnic groups in the United States with the exception of Puerto Ricans (Grebler et al. 1970:577). While the closeness of the border and the intention of returning to Mexico may contribute to the Chicano language retention, constant discrimination and the resultant occupational and residential isolation are undoubtedly the major causes of this phenomenon (Williams 1968:298). Hemmed in by the hostility of the greater society, pushed into the worst jobs, given a deficient education, the Chicano responds by withdrawing into warmth of the barrio, in which his native language is spoken.

The proximity of the Mexican border, and the great magnitude of illegal immigration has also meant that the Chicano community has had to live under the constant fear of deportation. Although desired during periods of economic expansion and short labor supply, Mexican immigrants are unwanted in times of excess labor.

Permenant Mexican immigration into the U.S. is associated systematically with periods of economic expansion (Grebler 1966:901). The

efforts of employers in the Southwest and Midwest to procure Mexican labor during periods of economic growth became the most important aspect underlying most Mexican movement into the U.S., giving rise to large numbers of illegal as well as legal immigrants (Samora 1971:39).

Estimates of the size of the Mexican population living within contemporary U.S. boundaries at the time of the Mexican-American war range from 75,000 to a high of 116,000 (Martinez 1975). With the construction of railroads from the interior of Mexico to the border region and with the decimation of that country by the Mexican revolution of 1910-1917, Mexicans were drawn into the U.S., expecially in the decade of 1920 to 1930. Commercial interests were able to exempt Mexicans from the 1924 National Origins Act which greatly diminished immigration from Europe. By the end of the 1920's, close to 700,000 Mexicans had entered on permanent visa (Grebler 1966; Elac 1961).

After the great Depression of 1929, however, Dust Bowl migrants and urban unemployed became available as cheap labor, making the Mexicans unnecessary. Looked upon as a burden who contributed to swelling relief rolls, over 400,000 Mexicans were sent back to Mexico between 1929 and 1934 without formal proceedings (Moore 1975:42). This policy affected both American citizens of Mexican origin and illegal aliens.

With WWII came a new need for farm workers as the war drew native laborers into industry. Both legally contracted and illegal aliens were procured. The Bracero Program was instituted by the U.S. government in 1942 to arrange for Mexican workers. After a short moratorium following the war, the program was reinstituted under Public Law 78 in 1951. Over 4 million braceros entered the U.S. between 1951 and 1964, during which

time over 5 million illegals or wetbacks were apprehended (Samora 1971: 19). By 1954 the influx of illegals had become so serious that the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service began a new repatriation campaign, "Operation Wetback." In five years 3.8 million Mexicans were expelled. As in the Great Depression, infringement of the civil rights of hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens occurred.

Although the bracero program was terminated by the end of 1964, the flow of illegal entrants continues. The number apprehended has increased from 39,124 in 1963 to over 800,000 in 1974 (Piore 1975). The reason they come remains the same: an insatiable call for cheap and mobile labor in the U.S. and the trememdous growth of Mexico's population (Samora 1971:9).

Geographic Boundaries and Deomgraphic Patterns

Over 1.5 million Mexicans were admitted to the U.S. as legal immigrants in the last 100 years; their number over the past ten years has been over 450,000, more than from any other country. The Mexicans entering the U.S. most often move into the Southwest. In fact, the vast majority of Chicanos have remained in the area of the original Mexican concentration. Only 10% of Chicanos reside outside the Southwest.

Mexican-Americans have participated in the national rural to urban migration and in the movement of population into California. In 1940 almost one-half of the Chicano population was rural; by 1970, 85 percent were urban (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1974: Chart B-A, p. 24). These figures illustrate that Chicanos, though stereotyped as a rural people, are actually more urbanized than is the total U.S.

population, 73% of whom live in urban areas. Whereas California and Texas had equal numbers of Chicanos in 1960, by 1970 California contained almost 50% of the total Southwestern Chicano population. Texas had 36% in the same year. The Los Angeles Chicano population of 980,000 exceeded the total number living in Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico combined (Moore 1975:55).

Chicanos tend to be concentrated within particular local areas, For example, most of California's Chicano population is found in Los Angeles and smaller nearby cities in Southern California. Texas Chicanos are gathered into South Texas. Chicanos generally reside in their own ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods or barrios. These Chicano enclaves are, on the whole, either the result of the engulfing of an original Mexican town or the residue of early labor camps.

According to official census data, there were almost 6.7 million Chicanos in the U.S. in 1975. However this number may be misleading due to the ambiguity of the criteria used by the Census Bureau and the fact that many individuals choose to avoid being enumerated (Martinez 1975; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1974a). The great demographic significance of the Chicano population is that they form more than 15 percent of the inhabitants of the Southwest. Of the 6.4 million Spanish origin persons residing in the Southwest in 1975, 85% reported themselves of Mexican origin (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976a:4). Although the rate of Mexican immigration is high, over 80% of Chicanos were native born.

As a result of the high rate of Mexican immigration and high fertility rates, Chicanos are the fastest growing demographic sector in the Southwest. They nearly doubled between 1950 and 1970 as compared to an

increase of Anglos of 67% and Blacks of 61%. Chicano women were 40% more fertile than Anglo women. Nationally, Chicano family sizes were greater than those of any other category of people in the U.S., averaging 4.5 persons in 1970 as compared to a U.S. average of 3.6. Almost half of the Chicano population is under 18 years of age. In contrast, only one-third of the national population falls into this category.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PATTERNS

The internal colony status of Chicano society manifests itself in terms of socioeconimic and political patterns which differentiate the colony from the national sector. On all the key social, economic and political indicators, Chicanos are deficient relative to national averages, and, especially to Anglos. Chicano earnings are much lower; their unemployment and underemployment rates are much higher as are their poverty rates; their educational levels are deficient as are their monetary returns to education; their income from the same type of work is less; their voting participation is lower; they are underrepresented in political offices and agencies at every level of government; they are not represented in the higher levels of party organization.

Furthermore, typical paths to socioeconomic improvement have not worked for Chicanos: the realtive status of the Chicano stays inferior in the rural and urban Southwest as well as the industrial cities of the Midwest; third generation and later Chicanos do not exhibit any significant gains in these key indices over their second generation compatriots and remain distressingly lacking compared to Anglos. An examination of some of these key indicators is in order and will make apparent that Chicanos

form a separate and excluded sector of society. For the purposes of this report economic indicators include income, the relationship between income and education, the relationship between income and occupation, unemployment and underemployment, ownership of productive resources, occupational distribution and the pattern of Chicano socioeconomic mobility.

Income

There are large disparities in earnings between Chicanos and Anglos[3] no matter what indices of income are used. For example, the difference between the two groups in median income of families in 1974 was $3,858 (see Table 1). The ratio of Mexican origin to Anglo[4] family income has risen by 1% since 1970 from 0.70 to 0.71 in 1974. Assuming a stable rate of increase it would take until 2090 for the median Chicano family income to match that of the average Anglo family. Comparing the Mexican-American to Anglo family income ratio in 1960 and 1974[5] provides a similar picture: it would not be until 2082 that Chicano family incomes would equal those of Anglo families if the ratio rate increase were to remain constant (see Table 1).

The situation looks even bleaker when family sizes are taken into account. The average number of persons in households of Mexican origin was 4.28 in 1975 compared to a national average of 3.42 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976a:12). The per capita income of Chicanos of $1,716 in 1969 was little more than half that of the national population average of $3,139 (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1974:69). The median earnings of Anglos[3] in 1973 was $9,022, almost twice as high

Table 1

Median Income of Families by Ethnic Origin

Year	Total	White	Mexican	Anglo	Ratio: Mexican to Anglo	Ratio: Mexican to White
1960	____[f]	____[f]	$4,164[e]	$6,448[d]	0.65[a]	____
1970	9,867	10,236	7,117	____[c]	____[c]	0.70
1973	12,051	12,595	8,434	____[c]	____[c]	0.67
1974	12,836	13,356	9,498	13,740[b]	0.69[a]	0.71

[a]The 1960 figure is the ratio of the median income of Spanish-surname families in the Southwest to the median Anglo income of families in the Southwest whereas the 1974 figure is the ratio of Mexican origin median family earnings in the entire United States to Anglo median family earnings in the U.S.

[b]Calculated by subtracting the number of Spanish-surname families from the white families, finding the total earnings of white families, subtracting the Spanish-surname family earnings from the latter, and dividing the results of the last two operations by the results of the first operation.

[c]Not calculated.

[d]Median family income of Anglo families in the Southwest.

[e]Median family income of Spanish-surname families in the Southwest.

[f]Not recorded.

Sources: L. Grebler et. al., 1970. The Mexican American People (Table 2-3, p. 19 and Table 8-1, p. 181). New York: The Free Press.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976. "Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1975." Population Characteristics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 290, February 1976 (Table 25, p. 43). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976. "Population Profile of the United States: 1975." Population Characteristics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 292, March 1976 (Table 25, p.40). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974. "Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1974." Population Characteristics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 265, July 1974 (Table 9, p.7). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1971. "Selected Characteristics of Persons and Families of Mexican, Puerto Rican and other Spanish Origin: March 1971." Population Characteristics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 224, October 1971 (p.5). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

as the corresponding figure for Mexicans ($4,982--see Table 2).

Chicanos are disproportionately represented in the poverty level category. Poverty is such an ongoing and pervasive fact of Chicano life that in the prosperous decade of the 1960's there was a net absolute increase of over 100,000 in the poverty level of the Chicano population (Briggs 1973:14). Moreover, the proportion of poor Mexican origin families has remained at about 1/4 since 1969, over 10% greater than the proportion of poverty level families found in the total population (see Table 4). While over-represented in low income categories, Chicanos are underepresented in higher ones. Only 20.3% of the families of Mexican origin had an income greater than $15,000 as compared to 42.1% of white families (see Table 3)

Unemployment, Underemployment, and Occupational Structure

Chicano unemployment rates are higher than national averages. For example, 6% of Chicano men and 9% of Chicanas were unemployed in 1969, rates that were 2.1% and 4% higher than national averages (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1974:67). In 1975, the percent of unemployed whites was 7.8% as compared to 12.7% of those of Spanish origin[6](Bureau of the Census 1966: Table 25, p.39). As demonstrated below, the relative unemployment and underemployment disparities are exacerbated when the situation of Chicano teenagers and young adults is examined.

The limited earnings of Chicanos directly reflects their position in the occupational structure. The proportion of Chicanos employed in high status and high paying professional and managerial occupations is

Table 2

Median Earnings in 1973 of Persons 25 Years and Over
Of School Completed and Ethnic Origin

Years of School Completed	Total U.S.	White	Mexican
Total 25 Years and over	$8,703	9,022	4,982
Less than 8 years	5,230	5,644	3,846
8 years	6,505	6,711	4,958
High School 1-3 years	6,974	7,316	6,422
4 years	8,205	8,357	6,620

Sources:

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. "Special Economic Characteristics of Metropolitan and non-Metropolitan Population, 1974 and 1970." Special Studies. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-23, No. 55, Sept. 1975 (Table 10, p.58). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974. "Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1974." Population Characteristics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Buearu of the Census, Series P-20, No. 264, July 1974 (Table 8, p.6). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Table 3

Median Family Income in 1974 by Ethnic Origin by Monetary Category

	Total	White	Spanish Origin	Mexican
Under $5,000	13.0	11.1	21.6	21.1
$5,000 to $9,999	22.6	21.9	31.1	31.5
$10,000 to $14,999	24.3	25.1	24.3	26.6
$15,000 and over	39.8	42.1	23.1	20.3
Median Family Income	$12,836	$13,356	$9,559	$9,498

Sources:

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976. "Population Profile of the United States: 1975." Population Characteristics, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 292, March 1976 (Table 25, p. 40). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976. "Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1975." Population Characteristics, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 290, February 1976 (Table 25, p. 43). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Table 4

Population in the Poverty Level

Year	U.S. Total	Chicanos
1969	11%	24%
1973	11.1%	23.5%

Sources:

U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1974. A Study of Selected Socio-Economic Characteristics of Ethnic Minorities Based on the 1970 Census, Vol. I: Americans of Spanish Origin (Table G-1, p.84). Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974. "Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1974." Population Characteristics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 267, July 1974 (Table 10, p.7). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

extremely low. In March of 1974 approximately 10% of Chicano males were employed in such occupations as compared to 30% of the whites (Table 5A). Within the broad occupational classifications, studies have shown that Chicanos hold the poorer jobs (see Fogel 1967; Schmidt 1970). Schmidt, who analyzed employment patterns in twenty Southwestern counties, observes that:

> "Overrepresentation of Spanish surnames [in the Southwest] in the operative category occurred mainly because of their excessive representation in less desirable jobs, such as, furnaceman, smelterman,. . .laundry and dry cleaning operators and so on. . ." (Schmidt 1970:19).

This holds true for other categories as well:

> "In the managerial classification [Chicanos are] far more likely to be managers of small marginal restaurants than corporate executives.. . .Chicanos are greatly underepresented in the highly unionized and better paying industries (aircraft, chemical and petroleum).. . . Among service workers, Mexicans do very poorly--largely because of their widespread exclusion from city fire and police protection jobs which pay well" (Moore 1970:62).

The occupational distribution of Chicanos has shown only a slight change since 1960 (see Talbes 5A and5B). More significant, assuming that the same rate of entrance of Chicanos into white colar jobs as occurred over the 1960-1970 period is maintained, and assuming that the white percent of such positions remains the same, it will take Chicanos 138 years to match the white, white-colar occupational profile. Furthermore, the rate of growth of the percent of Chicanos in white-collar positions has slowed down since 1970.

Given the type of jobs occupied, the income disparity between Chicanos and Anglos increase throughout their working lives (Moore 1970b: 161). To sum up, Chicanos not only hold the poorer jobs within the

Table 5A

Occupational Distribution of Males 16 and Over by Major Occupation and Ethnic Origin, 1960, 1970, 1971 and 1974.

Occupational Category	U.S. Total March 1974	White 1974	Mexican 1974	Mexican 1970	Spanish Surname[a] Southwestern States 1960
White Collar	40.4	42	18.6	18.1	16.2
Professionals and Technical	14.1	15	5.2	5.3	3.9
Managers and Administrators, except farm.	14.1	15	5.7	4.0	4.3
Clerical workers	6.6	6	5.0	5.8	4.6
Sales workers	6.1	6	2.7	3.2	3.4

[a]Note that although data were not available for persons of Mexican origin in 1960, the Spanish surnamed of the Southwest is a good approximation to this category because: (1) the vast majority of Chicanos live in the 5 states of the Southwest (in 1960, about 87% of the estimated total Mexican-Americans lived in this region); and (2) almost all persons of Spanish surname in the Southwest are of Mexican origin.

Sources:

L. Grebler et. al., 1970. The Mexican American People (Table 9-2, p. 209). New York: The Free Press.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974. "Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1974." Population Characteristics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 267, July 1974 (Table 6, p. 5). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. "The Social and Eocnomic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1974." Special Studies. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-23, No. 54, July 1975 (Table 48, p. 73). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1974. A Study of Selected Socio-Economic Characteristics of Ethnic Minorities Based on the 1970 Census, Vol. I: Americans of Spanish Origin (p. 63). Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Table 5B

Occupational Distribution of Males 16 and Over by Major Occupation and Ethnic Origin, 1960, 1970, 1971 and 1974.

Occupational Category	U.S. Total March 1974	White 1974	Mexican 1974	Mexican 1970	Spanish Surname[a] Southwestern States 1960
Blue Collar	46.1	46	60.2	61.0	53.1
Skilled Craftsmen	20.9	21	19.2	21.0	15.8
Semi-skilled Operations, incl. transportation	17.9	12	26.8	27	22.9
Laborers, except farm	7.3	7	14.2	13	14.4
Farm Workers	4.8	5	11.8	9.8	18.2
Farm Laborers and Supervisors	3.0	2	11.4	___[b]	16.0
Farmers and farm managers	1.8	3	0.4	___[b]	2.2
Service Workers	8.2	7	9.3	11	7.2

[a] See Note a in Table 5A.

[b] Not available.

Sources:

Same as for Table 5A.

broad occupational classifications, but also receive lower pay for similar kinds of work (Fogel 1967; Schmidt 1970).

Income and Education

The low incomes of Chicanos cannot be attributed solely to years of schooling or educational attainment. At all levels of educational achievement, Chicano earnings remain well below those of whites (see Table 2). Thus, Chicano high school graduates earned $6,620 annually while their white counterparts received $8,357. These findings are consistent with earlier studies (see Fogel 1965). Moreover, not only do Chicano earnings not match those of equivalently educated Anglos, but their returns from education are also less. For example, Mexican persons who graduated high school in 1973 but who did not go on to the university only earned $198 more than Chicanos who finished 1 to 3 years of high school. In contrast, white high school graduates who did not extend their education had annual incomes $1,041 above those whites who had 1 to 3 years of high school (Table 2).

Ownership of Productive Resources

Chicano ownership of land and business enterprises is limited. Chicano enterprises are a marginal sector of the business community in every industry, accounting for only 0.9% of all firms (excluding corporations) in the country and for only 0.8% of nationwide gross receipts (Table 6). The Chicano society's share of businesses has not increased since 1969. The Chicano's relative disadvantage in business becomes astronomical when corporations are considered. Their corporations which

Table 6

Number and Gross Receipts of Total and Ethnic-Owned Firms, Excluding Corporations, by Industry Division, 1972.

	Number of firms 1972 (thousands)		Percent Chicano of all firms		Gross Receipts, 1972		Percent Chicano Gross Receipts of all firms
	Total	Chicano	1972	1969	Total (millions of dollars)	Chicano	1972
All Industries	7,053	63	0.9	0.9	289,318	2,446	0.8
Construction	865	8	0.9	___[a]	36,564	330	0.9
Manufacturing	233	1.8	0.8	___[a]	13,605	116	0.8

[a]Not calculated.

Sources:

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. "Minority-Owned Businesses: Spanish Origin." 1972 Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Special Report MB72-2, 1975 (Table 7, pp.188-189). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. "The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1974." Special Studies. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-23, No. 54, July 1975 (Table 59, p.85). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

grossed about 345 million dollars in 1972 numbered only 603 as compared to over 7.8 million active total U.S. corporations whose gross receipts were over 2,000 billion dollars. The percent of Chicano gross receipts to the U.S. business total in 1972 was only 0.14%, which represents a slight decrease from the 1969 figure.[8]

Although black firms also constitute a marginal sector of the business community, Chicanos, according to Joan Moore are relatively worse off than blacks:

> "Nor are Mexicans successful entrepreneurs, even inside their own ethnic communities. Even the small insurance, banking and manufacturing interests long associated with the Negro community are largely missing among Mexicans" (Moore 1970b:64).

Socioeconomic Mobility

We have seen that there are wide disparities between Chicanos and the national sector in all key economic indicators. We have also found that the relative position of Chicanos is improving only at a snail's pace. Still it is possible that Chicanos are having problems because many are recent immigrants, or children of recent immigrants, or perhaps their mobility is restricted because they are mainly rural; or perhaps because they are confined mainly to the Southwest. This section investigates all these possibilities.

Although a commonly used paradign of social mobility for immigrants predicts that they will achieve income and occupational equivalence with the rest of the population by the third generation (see Glazer and Moynihan 1970; Gordon 1972), Chicanos socioeconomic movement appears to terminate in the third generation well below U.S. national averages.

Thus, the lagging of Chicanos behind national levels on all key socio-economic indicators cannot be seen as just a reflection of the recency of their ancestor's arrival as an immigrant group in the U.S. As of 1970, in fact, a majority of Chicanos--57% of their total population--were third generation or more as compared to 16% of foreign born parentage (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1974:27). Despite ranking higher in educational attainment than second generation Chicanos (native born of Mexican born), the earnings of the third or later generation (native born of native born)[9] are lower and their occupational profile is not significantly different than that of the native born of Mexican born. The percent of males employed in white-collar positions in 1969 was just 3% higher for native born men of native born parentage, 25 versus 22 percent for their counterparts of second generation. (See Table 7.) The national average of males holding white-colar jobs that year was 40%. (See Table 5.) The difference in earnings between the second generation and the native born of native born parentage is probably due to the greater percentage of older age category workers who have more seniority in the former group (see Table 8). Still, the results are disturbingly surprising, especially, in light of the fact that 35% of the working third generation or later are in the older age categories (35 to 64 years of age level).

For Chicanos, like Blacks and unlike European ethnics, "native parentage seems to carry few additional benefits" (Moore 1970:57). The model of stagnated socioeconomic mobility from the second generation onward holds in both the urban and rural Southwest, and in the industrial cities of the Midwest. For instance, the median income of family heads

Table 7

Education, Income and White Collar Rankings in 1970 of Chicanos by Nativity

Nativity Class	Percent Graduated H.S.	Median Income of Families with Head	Percent of Males Employed in White Collar Jobs
Foreign Born	13	$6,127	12
Native Born of Foreign Born	30	7,604	22
Native Born of Native Born	37	6,795	25

Sources:

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973. "Persons of Spanish Surname." 1970 Census of Population. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, PC(2)-1D (Table 10, pp.60-61; Table 12, pp.81-82 and Table 7, pp.21-22). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Table 8

Employment Characteristics of Spanish Surname, 1970,
16 Years Old and Over, 5 Southwestern States by Nativity and Sex

	Total employed 16 and over	16 to 19 years (percent of total)	20 to 34	35 to 64
Male				
All classes	1,080,281	11	39	46
Native of native parentage	474,161	16	47	35
Native of Mexican parentage	307,630	8	36	50
Female				
All classes	618,348	12	45	40
Native of native parentage	303,424	17	48	31
Native of Mexican parentage	195,609	11	40	48

Source:

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973. "Persons of Spanish Surname." 1970 Census of Population. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, PC(2)-1D (Table 10, pp.60-61). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

of Spanish surname of the second generation is greater than that of the native of native born in the urban, rural nonfarm, and rural farm settings of the Southwest (see Table 9). Using 1960 data, Fogel (1965:5) and Mittlebach and Marshall (1966:15) found the same result.

Indeed, none of the possible paths to socioeconomic improvement open to Chicanos appear to close the gap between them and the general population. These routes are: rural to urban migration in the Southwest; moving from the lower income areas of the Southwest to the higher earning ones like California; or migrating from agricultural areas in Texas to industrial cities of the Midwest. Chicanos have availed themselves of all three possibilities with limited results.

Although Chicanos' incomes increase as they shift residence from a rural to urban setting, urban Chicanos are relatively more worse off compared to their Anglo counterparts than are rural Chicanos in relation to rural Anglos. Thus, in 1959 the Chicanos family percentage of all poor families in the Southwest increased from 13 percent in rural farm areas to 17 percent in urban areas, while the Anglo representation in the poverty group decreased from 76 percent to 65 percent in moving from a rural to an urban setting. As two authors have concluded, "It appears that urganization may widen rather than narrow the differential in the incidence of poverty between members of the minority groups and the majority " (Mittlebach and Marshall 1966:23-24).

Furthermore, although the Chicanos occupational profile improves by moving from a rural to an urban setting--the percent of those employed holding white-colar jobs in 1969 was 9.5 in rural areas as compared to 21.6 for urban residents[10]--the position of urban Chicanos relative to

Table 9

Median Income by Nativity of Families with Head of Spanish Surname, 1970, Urban and Rural, Southwest

Nativity Class	Total	Urban	Rural Nonfarm	Rural Farm
All classes	$7,077	7,393	5,243	5,023
Family head of native parentage	6,795	7,140	5,142	4,687
Family head of Mexican parentage	7,604	7,891	5,461	4,736
Family head born in Mexico	6,127	6,382	4,812	4,687

Source:

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973. "Persons of Spanish Surname." 1970 Census of Population. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, PC(2)-1D (Table 12, pp.81-82). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

urban Anglos has been deteriorating: "Seven percent more (urban Anglo-Americans were in white-collar jobs in 1970 than in 1960 as compared to only 2.5 percent more urban Chicanos" (Moore 1975:64). For his part, Ramirez concluded that "urbanization has in no way been accompanied by a comparable increase in general occupation skill level" (1970:183).

Case studies support both the view that the relative position of Chicanos in an urban setting does not change and the model which asserts that social mobility ends at the second generation. For example, in his analysis of mobility patterns in Compton's Barrio in Los Angeles, Camarillo found that "occupational mobility into semi-skilled and skilled employment positions was a deadend for the vast majority of Chicanos workers" (Camarillo 1971:98). Very few moved up to secure higher status white-collar and professional positions, in opposition to the historical pattern manifested by Anglo immigrant groups (Camarillo, 1971:90,98).

Even less promising is the plight of the younger urban Chicano population. The evidence suggests that a major percentage of young Chicanos may be condemned to a perpetual state of joblessness or a cycle of low paying jobs that lack opportunities for advancement. In his survey of the employment situation of Chicano teenagers and young adults in East Los Angeles, Bullock found that one third of Chicano men under 24 either recently lost their jobs, are long-term unemployed or have joined the ranks of the discouraged, those who are now out of the labor force but want a regular job (Bullock 1973:12-16). This condition of unemployment was three times the rate of their white counterparts for the same year.

The unemployment problems of the people in the survey were not the result of being the most recent and hence the lowest income imigrants. Over 80 percent of Bullock's sample population had lived in Los Angeles County all their lives.

Chicanos do improve their incomes and education by moving to California. However, as the studies of Camarillo (1971) and Bullock (1973) indicate, their situation remains the same: significantly below Anglos in all key socioeconomic indicators. For instance, California's occupational distribution for 1969, shows that only 8.6 percent of Chicano employed males held professional and managerial positions, a figure which was not only well below the U.S. total of 25.5 percent in such occupations, but also compared unfavorably to the Chicano employment profile in every other Southwestern state (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1974: Table E-1, p. 63).

Chicanos in small numbers reside in metropolitan centers of the Midwest, such as Chicago. Some sociologists have claimed that a rough equalization of wealth and power between different ethnic groups should take place over time in large cities (see Glazer and Moynihan,for example, 1970:xxxiii). The data available show that the occupational profile of Chicanos in Illinois is actually worse than in every state of the Southwest (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1974: Table E-1, p. 63). These results in themselves could still be explained by the Glazer and Moynihan model; namely that Chicanos may be very recent immigrants to Midwestern industrial centers and have not begun their social ascent. However, historical case studies refute this conclusion. Samora and Lamanna (1967), for example, found that the socioeconomic position of Mexican-Americans

in the highly industrialized city of East Chicago, Indiana, where Chicanos have lived and settled in substantial numbers since the 1920's, does not vary meaningfully from that of their counterparts in urban Southwestern areas (Grebler 1967:v). Economically, Chicanos in the midwest have remained frozen in lower pay and status level jobs; politically they have not developed any significant power of influence (Samora and Lamanna 1967:83;130-132). In terms of business ownership, while the large and more successful enterprises, such as department stores, banks, drug stores, retail outlets and so on, are owned and dominated by others, Chicanos possess only small and marginal concerns of limited economic significance (ibid). In comparing the experience of Chicanos with white ethnics in East Chicago, Samora and Lamanna state:

> "It is ... surprising that the Eastern Europeans, who arrived only a little earlier than the Mexicans in East Chicago but who also had a language problem, have apparently done so much better than the Mexican-Americans in achieving higher status jobs" (1967:80).

Other scholarly investigations made in different Midwest cities support the findings of Samora and Lamanna (see Rosales and Simon 1975 and Grebler 1967:vi).

In summary, we have found that Chicanos, unlike European ethnic groups, experience a freezing of their socioeconomic mobility in terms of occupation and income in the second generation at levels well below national averages. Relative to Anglos, Chicanos remain in the same subordinate position, whether in the rural or urban Southwest, Texas or California, or the industrial cities of the Midwest. Like other economic indicators, socioeconomic mobility reinforces our conclusion that Chicanos form an excluded sector of U.S. society.

Education

Education is an important ingredient in obtaining access to expanding socioeconomic opportunities. This is especially true as technically sophisticated professions burgeon and the academic requirements for even unskilled and semi-skilled positions increase. However, this route to upward mobility appears to hold little prospect for improving the overall economic and labor market prospects of Chicanos.

Let us examine why education holds little promise for the Chicano. First, as we have seen, Chicano earnings are both less than Anglos of the same academic achievement, and their returns to education are less. Secondly, the adult Chicano population ranks low on all indices of education, reducing its ability to compete effectively in the modern economic world. In March 1974 over 26.5 percent of the Chicano population 25 years of age or more had not completed five years of schooling. Only 29.1 percent had graduated from high school. (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976a:Table C, p. 5.). Thirdly, Chicano school participation rates are lower, their dropout rates are higher and the education they receive is inferior.[11] A study by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1971a) found that while 86 percent of Anglos graduate from high school in the Southwest only 60.3 percent of the Chicanos managed to do so (see Moore 1975:Figure 4-2,p. 70). Similarly, only 5.4 percent Chicanos complete college, 18.4 percent less than the percent of Anglos who do so.

There has been some closing of the primary and secondary school educational gap over time, especially when the youngest adults are considered. However, the entrance of Chicanos into universities and into graduate departments has not increased since 1970 (Ornelas et.al. 1975:6). Ornelas et. al. point out several examples. Although UCLA is located in an area which

contains over one million Chicanos and in a state where Chicanos total over three million, UCLA's political science department has produced only one Chicano Ph.D. and has no other doctoral candidate in sight (ibid:7).

The situation appears to be worsening in most academic disciplines. For example, whereas Chicanos numbered 3 out of 56 graduate students in political science at UCLA in the 1970-1971 period, there was only 1 Chicano in a class of 100 graduate students in the 1972-1973 academic year. Showing an equally dismal record is the University of Texas. The latter, although in a state which has over 2 million Chicanos, has no Chicano faculty members and no doctoral candidates in political science (Ornelas et. al. 1975). The overall picture shows only 12 Chicano political science Ph.D.'s "in a profession that claims some 4,000 doctorates" (ibid:8).

Chicano underrepresentation in faculty positions is mirrored at all levels of education. Despite constituting about 17 percent of the enrollment in schools in the Southwest, only 0.4 percent of the teachers are Chicanos. Illustrative of this latter problem is the Patterson Unified School District, in the San Joaquin Valley of California. Of the 116 teachers in the school system only five are bilingual despite the fact that Spanish-speaking students formed 52 percent of the total in 1969 (Carlos and Brokensha 1972:148).

Health and Housing

Chicanos are deficient compared to the national population on the basis of housing and health indices. Overcrowded and dilapidated residences, as well as high death rates and incidences of various diseases, are concomittants of Chicano community poverty. A study of the Spanish surnamed in

Colorado[12] found that the mean average age at death of Spanish surnamed persons who survive their first year was more than 10 years lower than the state average; poorer prenatal care and/or dietary deficiency of the mother resulted in a Spanish surnamed death rate at birth about twice as high as those for others in the population (Schmidt 1970). Available health data on the Chicano population across the Southwest supports the conclusions of the Colorado study (see Moustafa and Weiss 1968:5 and Moore 1975:75).

Overcrowded[13] and substandard housing also rank as causes of poor health among Chicanos in the five Southwestern states: over one-third of the Spanish surnamed in 1960 lived in overcrowded conditions as contrasted to only 7.7 percent of Anglo families and 11 percent of all families (Mittlebach and Marshall 1966:Table 12, p. 44). What 1970 figures are available indicate that this situation has not changed. Thus, by 1970 28 percent of Chicano homes were classified as overcrowded in Los Angeles as opposed to only 8 percent of the homes of the total population. In Houston, Texas, the comparable figures were 32 percent and 10 percent (Moore 1975:74). The quality of Chicano shelter is also worse. The incidence of dilapidation, which is usually associated with high rates of unsanitary housing without minimum plumbing facilities was seven times as great among Chicano occupied housing units in 1960 as among Anglo homes (Mittlebach and Marshall 1966:43).

POLITICAL PATTERNS

Chicano political exclusion parallels their socioeconomic marginality. In this section we shall investigate the dimensions and consequences of

political marginality by examining several indicators: political participation, political representation, and access to policy-making and policy-makers, and to the socioeconomic resources controlled by the government.

Political Participation and Representation

Politics has been a means to socioeconomic advance for most ethnic groups in the U.S., especially members of European ethnic groups. Chicanos, however, have had less of a voice in government affairs either through voting or representation and have held fewer official positions than all other major ethnic groups in the United States.

Only 45 percent of the Chicanos were on the voting rolls in 1972 in contrast to 67.5 percent of Blacks and 76.7 percent of Irish. Voting in the 1972 national elections was 36.7 percent, 54.1 percent and 66 percent of the registered voters for the three groups, respectively.[14] National statistics are reflected locally. In the 1968 mayoral election in Los Angeles, just under 60 percent of the Mexican-Americans eligible voted as compared to a citywide average of 76 percent. In San Antonio, Texas only 35 to 40 percent of the qualified Mexican Americans were on the city's voting lists (Kimball 1972:193ff).

Overall, despite regional variability, we find an extreme scarcity of Chicano appointed and elected officials "from the national and state legislative bodies to country boards of supervisors, to city councils, boards of education and grand juries" (Barrera et. al. 1972:486 -- see Grebler et. al., 1970:560ff; 222ff; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1970, 1971c).

National, Regional, and State Levels

The influences and visability of Chicanos at the national level has remained minimal. Recent studies show that most federal agencies had no Spanish-speaking representation whatsoever (Moore 1975:157).[15] Moreover, programs to increase Chicano national participation and influence have proved inadequate. After two years of the 16-Point Program to hire Spanish-speaking persons in the federal government instituted in 1970, federal employment of Chicanos and other Latinos increased only 0.3 percent to a total of 3.1 percent (Moore, ibid.). Although President Johnson established an "Inter-Agency Committee on Mexican American Affairs" to advise federal agencies on the needs and special problems of Mexican Americans in federal programs, this committee[16] had no director until 1970, was never adequately funded and was finally abolished in 1974 (ibid:157-158). There are only two Chicano Congressmen in Washington: Edward Roybal and Henry Gonzalez.

As on the national level, Chicanos have had a feeble political voice in the affairs of the Southwest where they are the largest minority. Indeed, although they constitute a large proportion of the total population in many of the smaller cities and rural areas of Texas, Arizona, and California, Chicanos have rarely been able to realize their potential to wield considerable political influence (Grebler et al., 1970:562). Chicanos continue to be unrepresented in government of all levels in the region, even in cities and towns of their greatest concentrations. Moreover, representation advances made by Chicanos have not yielded them greater access to decision-making and to government services for two reasons. First, despite Chicano successes in some cities and counties, especially in South Texas, Anglos remain firmly

in control of all statewide governmental bodies and major institutions. Secondly, Chicano representatives themselves remain token and/or must engage in consensus or majority politics and therefore tend to be coopted by the Anglo power structure. In either case, they cannot deliver effective gains in services to their Chicano constituency.

State and Local Variations

In all states except New Mexico, Chicanos have been grossly underrepresented in government of all levels. California is an excellent case in point. In 1971, the California State Advisory Committee found that while Chicanos comprised well over ten percent of the state's population, they held only 3.2 percent of the city and county government offices in the 18 counties with the largest Spanish-surnamed population (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1971c:46). In Los Angeles with a Chicano population of more than one million, there were no Chicanos serving on the City Council (ibid:56), nor had a Chicano ever served on the County Board of Supervisors (Kimball 1972:199). Out of 122 commissioners in the City of Los Angeles, only six to eight were Chicanos. As a result, Chicanos were underrepresented in critical boards like the Board of Education and Welfare.

Representation for the Chicano community was not much better at the state level. There were no Chicano senators, and of the 195 state legislators and advisors, two were Chicanos. Neither the state's top offices, nor any of the 132 state court positions was held by a Chicano. Chicanos filled only 1.5 percent of the 4,032 positions in the California government's executive branch (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1971c:1,46).

Chicano representation has improved somewhat since the State Advisory

Committee issued its report; a Chicano state senator was elected in 1974, the first since the 1880's, and there were eight Spanish-surnamed state legislators as of 1975 (see Table 10). Still, the Chicanos of California are grossly lacking representation in government of all levels. For instance, although their numerical strength should have given the Spanish surnamed 15.4 percent of the offices, only 6.7 percent of the state legislators were Spanish-surnamed and less than five percent of the U.S. Congressmen (see Table 11).

Illustrative of the situation of Chicanos in rural communities in California and other parts of the Southwest, is that of most communities in the San Joaquin Valley (see Carlos and Brokensha 1972). All elite positions of the formal economic and social organizations in the valley are held by Anglos who have developed an interlocking system of directorships. While Chicanos are not represented at all, Anglos are found in multiple agencies such as the growers' organization which determines agricultural labor wage rates, the Chamber of Commerce, City Council, School Board of Trustees and so forth (Carlos and Brokensha 1972:141).

The small political voice of Chicanos in California is mirrored in Texas. The Spanish-speaking account for 70-85 percent of the total population in the South Texas counties, yet the Anglo group has always wielded exclusive political power except in one or two localities. For the first time in contemporary history in 1963, a Chicano coalition wrested control of local government in a South Texas town, Crystal City. This initial breakthrough in Crystal City paved the way for the success of a Chicano third party, La Raza Unida (LRU). In April, 1970 a total of 15 LRU candidates were elected to office, including two new mayors, two school board majorities

Table 10

Spanish Surnamed State Legislators

Year	Arizona	California	Colorado	New Mexico	Texas
1950	0	0	0	20	0
1960	4	0	1	20	7
1965	6	0	1	22	6
1973	11	6	4	32	10
1975	11	8	6	29	12

Sources:

For 1975, John Clements, 1976. Encyclopedia of Government Officials, Federal and State. Vol.V 1975-76, Dallas, Texas: The McCullers Press.

For Years 1950 to 1973, Joan Moore, 1975. Mexican Americans, 2nd Edition. (Table 8-2, p. 56). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Table 11

Percent Spanish Surnamed in Population and Percent Spanish Surnamed State Legislators in the 5 Southwestern States

	Total Number of State Legislators in 1975	Number of Spanish Surname State Legislators, 1975	Percentage of Spanish Surnamed State Legislators, 1975	Percentage of Spanish Surnamed in Population 1975	1970
California	120	8	6.7	15.4	11.9
Texas	150	12	8.0	18.8	16.4
Colorado	104	6	5.8	____[b]	10.5
New Mexico	112	29	25.9	____[b]	30.8
Arizona	90	11	12.2	____[b]	15.0
Other[a]	306	46	15.0	17.1	16.0

[a]Other includes Arizona, Colorado and New Mexico.

[b]Not recorded.

Sources:

John Clements, 1976. Encyclopedia of Government Officials, Federal and State V, 1975-76. Dallas, Texas: The McCullers Press.

U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1974. A Study of Selected Socio-Economic Minorities Based on the 1970 Census, Vol.I: Americans of Spanish Origin. (Table I-2, p.4). Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976. "Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States: March 1975." Population Characteristics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 290, February 1976 (Table 8, p.4). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976. "Population Profile of the United States: 1975." Population Characteristics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 292, March 1976 (Table 17, p.25). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

and two city council majorities, in several South Texas counties (Juarez 1972:190).

The LRU scope of influence, however, is limited. First the LRU can succeed only in electoral districts where Chicanos are numerically dominant as in the cities and counties of South Texas. LRU, for instance, has not elected any candidates in California, where there are no concentrations of Chicanos comparable to those in South Texas.

Secondly, and most significantly, the LRU strategy can have minimal effect, even inside the local arena:

> "Even where Chicanos have been successful in gaining some political power and control, i.e., electing city councilmen and other local officials, the true political and economic power that controls the barrio eludes his grasp." (Almaguer 1971:18)

New Mexico differs from other states of the Southwest in that it had a comparatively large population of Mexicans at the time of the Anglo conquest, and only recently, have Anglos become a majority. As a result, the Mexican elite retained substantial political strength. They supplied state legislators and even U.S. senators with fair regularity (Moore 1970a: 466). This pattern continues today. Chicanos occupy 25.9 percent of the New Mexican State legislature seats, a far greater proportion than in any other state (see Table 11).

With such a high level of representation in this state, we might expect the Chicano community of New Mexico to wield considerable political influence. However, this is not the case. The elite was and has continued to be coopted by the Anglo establishment. The original Mexican leadership cooperated with Anglos in extending the latter's economic and political control. As Swadesh (196 :115) notes, in New Mexico,

> "Hand-picked Hispanos served in the legislature as junior partners to those who really held the reins. Their official task was to represent the overwhelming majority of the population, but in practice they helped keep this majority under control."

Chicano leaders in New Mexico have mostly been figureheads -- without real access to the policy-making process. While a Mexican-American is present in most city halls and almost all boards, they never take part in real decision making (Steiner 1970:191). Given this situation, representation loses its meaning.

Political Representation, Brokers and Access to Policy-Making

The case of New Mexico illustrates the many problems related to effective representation. Chicanos have not only been underrepresented, but lack of representation "is even more acute than statistics show, since in many cases the representatives of the barrio are hand-picked by Anglos ..." (Barrera, et. al. 1975:486). Chicanos, in many communities, have had brokers, those persons who tie the local community into upper-level policy-makers, but they have been ineffective. The Chicanos brokers themselves have no access to the highest channels of decision-making, remaining only at a local level of influence or without influence so that the Chicano community has remained without access to the socio-economic resources of government.

The Chicano leaders could penetrate the local governments of the small towns and rural areas of the Southwest only "by indirection, through Anglos who expected to be rewarded for such service" (Grebler 1970:556). Grebler et. al. continue:

> "Another kind of dependency evolved from the patron or boss, system within Mexican-American communities. The patron owed his economic status to the local Anglo powers, and one of his functions was to enlist the Mexican-American voters on the right side. This kind of rural patronismo has carried over into urban centers ..." (Grebler et. al. 1970:556-557).

The urban Chicano broker, like his rural counterpart is therefore a leader without resources.

Rather than emerging from their communities to participate in direct bargaining with the national sector as Anglo political leaders have done, Chicano politicians have been chosen by the established party machinery. Dependent on the national sector, the Chicano leader has had to be culturally and ideologically acceptable to it. This meant not only following the Anglo establishment's directives but also adopting Anglo ways. The successful Chicano leaders have been those who have Anglicized with the consequence that the barrio inhabitants are suspicious of them (see Tuck 1946:12; Steiner 1970:192ff).

Tokenism and cooptation has also been characteristic of Chicano representation in political parties. In spite of consistent and heavy support for the Democratic ticket in election districts from California to Texas, Chicanos have not been accorded many positions within the party. Those holding positions have been merely figureheads. For example, Eduardo Perez, the Secretary of the State and Committee of California during Governor Edumund Brown's administration, claimed that although his name was signed on party literature, he was never informed of what was going on in party affairs (Steiner 1970:191).

Chicanos have been increasing their representation throughout the Southwest. As late as 1969, Chicano representation in the Southwest, with the exception of New Mexico, ranged from zero to a high of one percent. At present Spanish surnamed representatives constitute from 6 to 26 percent of the Southwestern state legislators (see Table 11), and both Arizona and New Mexico had governors with Spanish surnames, but the table also reveals that

underrepresentation is still prevalent in the state legislatures. Moreover, the number of Chicano U.S. congressmen can be counted in the fingers of one hand, and, despite the large barrio populations of such cities as Phoenix, San Diego, San Antonio, Albuquerque, Denver, and Los Angeles, there is no major city in the Southwest with a Chicano mayor.[17]

At the national level, Chicanos have no cabinet level voice nor any effective channels to decision-making. The Presidential "Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish Speaking" is a classic case of cooptation and tokenism. Nixon belatedly appointed a director of the now abolished Committee in 1970 with an eye to capturing Chicano voters in the 1972 election. Rather than working for the Chicano sector, "some leaders of the committee were charged as being more interested in reelection of President Nixon than in furthering the interests of the Mexican American population." (Moore 1975:158).

Achieving input into the national government remains problematic. When Chicanos threatened to establish effective access to national level resources through the War On Poverty, these new avenues were closed. During the 1960's Chicanos controlled Community Action Agencies (CAA's) "provided for neighborhood based organizations capable of acting independently of state and local governments" (Rankin 1973:149). Able to contract directly with OEO for services like day care, work-training, health care and the like, the Community Action program workers had often used innovative techniques and, at times, organized the poor against established local authorities. In the 1970's funding of such programs was made dependent on state and municipal resources. Services under OEO were also divided among other cabinet departments like Labor and HEW. Thus Chicanos were forced to deal

with agencies and officials who "had not been just indifferent to their advancement but sometimes hostile to it." (Rankin 1973:149). Whatever political recognition Chicanos gained during the 60's disappeared in the early 70's.

MECHANISMS OF DOMINANCE AND CONTROL

In explaining the low levels of Chicano political participation and representation, many authors have used cultural and socioeconomic factors totally contained within the Chicano sector of society (e.g., D'Antonio and Form 1965:245; Barnfield 1965:76). It is claimed here that Anglo-dominated machinations and controls are the major reason for the past and present exclusion of Chicanos from political influence. These include the mechanisms of internal colonialism which allow the process of exploitation of the Chicano sector to continue.

The political mechanisms of Internal Colonialism produce and maintain a condition of powerlessness by denying Chicanos effective control over the institutions of the barrio and over those political institutions that affect the barrio. Tokenism and cooptation were discussed previously. Within this section, we explore other processes by which the Anglo elite excludes Chicanos from representation, self-organization, and access to decisions concerning their own interests and needs.[18]

The most direct and obvious mechanisms of dominance and control range from violent to nonviolent reprisals (Barrera et al. 1962:448). It was through force that Chicanos were first incorporated into the United States polity and divested of their land. Historical examples, including the use

of California state and local police to break up the unionization efforts of Chicano farmworkers in the 1930's (Jamieson 1945), abound. The Texas Rangers, notorious for their violent anti-Mexican practices, recently terrorized striking melon workers in Starr County, Texas (Steiner 1970: 359ff) and threatened the Chicano mayor of Crystal City (Grebler et. al. 1970:563).

Manuel Chavez, a recently elected commissioner of the town of Corpus Christi testified to the Texas Advisory Committee of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission that "intimidation and other acts by election officials, police, welfare officials and employers (are) designed to reduce the turnout of Latin American voters." (Chavez as quoted by Steiner 1970:190). Notable among the methods used were harrassment by police, warnings that welfare recipients might be dropped from welfare roles if they were seen in the "wrong places" on election day, and attempts by voting officials to confuse voters by implying that there were property qualifications for voting.

Chicano political influence also has been impeded through literacy tests and poll taxes, and by the more subtle exclusionary mechanisms of residency requirements, periodic voter disqualifications, and voter registration laws. The courts or Congress, by now, have abolished such direct obstacles to voter participation as literacy tests and poll taxes, but certain voter registration procedures still operate as an effective barrier to Chicanos (Kimball 1972; Grebler et. al. 1970). Chicanos are intimidated even where registration procedures are liberal as in California. Kimball emphasizes that:

> "The registration of new voters at infrequent intervals, in the political off-season and at hard-to-find locations, discriminates against Blacks and Hispanics as effectively as do the impediments proscribed by the Federal Voting Rights Statutes." (Kimball 1972:15)

Other mechanisms of control and dominance are:

1. Gerrymandering: The designation of election districts so that Chicanos do not predominate in any one district has been a pervasive technique. For example, two Chicanos, who in 1962 had been the first Mexican-Americans elected to the California State Assembly in over 75 years later lost their seats" when their districts were drawn out of the Chicano strongholds of East Los Angeles"(Juarez 1972:138).
2. Changing the Rules of the Game: Election laws have been changed when Chicanos asserted themselves under existing rules. El Paso's political elite, for instance, succeeded in making city elections nonpartisan after the Democratic primary was won by a Chicano (Barrera 1972:493).
3. Non-decision Making: Non-decision making means the power to keep certain demands for change in the existing allocation of socio-economic resources from gaining access to the arenas of decision making (Bachrach and Baratz 1970:44). For example, those who continue to blame the socioeconomic and political problems of Chicanos on their own intragroup deficiencies provide an alibi for failing to undertake basic institutional changes needed to effectively attack poverty.
4. Divide and Conquer: This mechanism consists of sponsoring the candidacy of a Chicano to thwart the election of another Chicano. For instance, in 1970, Richard Caleron was defeated by 2,000 votes in an election for a Senate seat in California when a Spanish-surnamed Democrat won 2,000 votes (Juarez 1972:195).

Summing up, the operation of these mechanisms has meant that Chicanos have only limited representation in policy-making and severely restricted influence over the political processes affecting public resource allocations and uses. The following sections analyze the consequences of the Chicano lack of effective brokers to articulate their demands. Examined, in turn, are the comparative value of public expenditure in Chicano communities, the nature of Chicano interaction with public institutions, and the effect of public policy on the Chicano population.

PUBLIC EXPENDITURE

Chicano society has always received comparatively deficient public services. The geographic segregation of Chicanos has facilitated the process of marking out their neighborhoods and districts for disparate consideration. Often, rural Chicano communities receive water from sources inferior to those that service the Anglo population. Furthermore, the streets of the Chicano section of town are unpaved, sewage systems inoperative, community services such as libraries, parks and recreation facilities are inferior or absent. This pattern prevails in urban barrios as well (Steiner 1970:155ff). In much of the Southwest the differential distribution of services is institutionalized by requiring the financing of neighborhood "improvements" through assessment or local property owners on a per capita basis. Chicano neighborhoods lack both the land values and income characteristic of Anglo areas.

Chicano communities have also been adversely affected by public policy in urban renewal programs. Displacement of Chicano barrios "is one of the major elements in the current life of the urban Mexican-Americans who live

in the so-called poverty tracts" (Galarza et. al. 1969:23). Chicano neighborhoods have been demolished to make way for freeways and new central cities as in San Jose, and for railroad stations and government buildings as in Los Angeles.

CHICANOS AND PUBLIC AGENCIES

Just as Chicanos have not obtained an adequate share of public services, they have also experienced unequal treatment from government institutions. This can be observed in the quality and availability of educational institutions, and the health care and welfare facilities which serve them. Police protection also has been very poor. The performance of these institutions is itself indicative of the internal colonial status of its clientele.

The Educational System

Chicano school districts generally receive less funding than their Anglo counterparts. Likewise Chicano neighborhood schools are understaffed by inferior teachers who are unsympathetic toward the lifestyle practiced by Chicano students. Much of the curricula in schools perpetuates cultural stereotypes destructive to Mexican American children. Schools also guide Chicanos into "vocational" programs which are intended to produce skilled laborers as opposed to college preparatory programs (Almaguer 1971), and fail to deal adequately with the linguistic differences of bilingual children.

Chicanos are isolated in the public schools of the Southwest by intra-school and interschool separation. Segregated residential patterns have perpetuated de facto segregation all through the Southwest in both urban and

rural environments. The educational system has ignored Mexican accomplishments and disparaged Chicano attempts at political organization. Many educators consider Chicanos as unmotivated, apathetic, nonadherent to time schedules and incapable of learning in American schools (Brischetto and Arciniega 1973:36). In contrast, many studies have shown that Chicano barrio youth are oriented to intergenerational mobility and share the middle class desire for educational attainments and high-paying and rewarding jobs (Bullock 1973; Kuvlesky and Patella 1971:234; D. E. Wright et. al. 1973).

The educational system's handling of linguistic and cultural differences is a further sympton of institutional failure. Simple suppression has been a major technique for handling the Chicano language and culture. As recently as 1972, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1972a) found that the use of Spanish was discouraged by at least one-third of the elementary and secondary schools. Most schools have required that Chicano children first learn English and then learn other skills. However, because nearly 50 percent of Chicano first graders do not speak English as well as the average Anglo first grader, Chicano children quickly fall behind and, in many cases, become illiterate in both Spanish and English (Flores 1973:207; Uranga 1973:166).

Lagging behind Anglos in their studies, discouraged from fulfilling their academic aims, abused for their linguistic differences, it is not surprising that Chicano dropout rates are so high. For example, absence of bicultural education and cultural subordinance result in a 20% Chicano attrition from Patterson High School in the San Joaquin Valley, California, against 3.7 percent for Anglos (Carlos and Brokensha 1972:149).

Welfare Services

Historically, Chicano contact with Welfare Departments has generated distrust and suspicion. The social welfare agencies cooperated with the power structure of local communities in repatriating Mexicans back to Mexico during the Depression (Moore 1975:97). Currently, welfare agencies stress the legal and administrative aspects of qualifying for aid rather than providing social improvement services, making these agencies nothing more than a caretaker institution, "concerned with supporting the Mexican-American in his subordinate position"(Carlos and Brokensha 1972:153).

Criminal Justice System

Force and outright repression have been characteristic of Chicano relations with law enforcement agencies and other elements of the criminal justice system, including local and state police and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A recent study conducted by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1970) revealed a widespread pattern of police misconduct, involving unjustified arrests, excessive police violence, insults, and not infrequently, physical assaults. Lack of redress for these police transgressions is common according to this report.

Mexican-Americans have been intimately involved with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, otherwise known as the Border Patrol. This agency is charged with enforcing a wide range of federal laws concerning movement of persons across U.S. borders as well as with apprehending deportable aliens. Raids on Chicano neighborhood bars and the garment factories in East Los Angeles are all a normal part of the Patrol's duties. However, such action, along with periodically intensified forays as those preceding the deportations

of the 1930's or during Operation Wetback have resulted in the Border Patrol's reputation of ferocity among Chicanos (Moore 1975:94).

The law enforcement agencies along with those of education and welfare have created a climate of distrust among their Chicano clients, which, in part, has motivated Chicanos to avoid contact with other U.S. institutions such as public health departments.

PUBLIC POLICY

Public policy, like government institutions, has differentially treated Chicanos and, thereby, helped to perpetuate their subordinate status. This section examines public policy in the areas of employment, the economy of crime, Chicano educational achievement, immigration and agricultural labor. The lack of Chicano representatives on both policy making bodies and public agencies charged with carrying out policy surfaces as one of the keys to the failure to initiate beneficial legislation, on one hand, and to enforce it, on the other.

Employment: Manpower Programs

The employment profile of the Chicano population is one of high unemployment and dead-end jobs. While Anglos find employment in "primary" or "core" industries in which there is a stable market for employment, high wages, good working conditions, established fringe benefits and opportunities for promotion, Chicanos like other non-white ethnic groups are concentrated in "peripheral" industries forming a "secondary labor market" of low wages, harsh and arbitrary discipline, jobs without advancement, instability and

unpredictability (Fiore 1971:91; Gordon 1972:46, 116; Harrison 1972: Chapter 5)

The relegation of Chicanos to low-paid jobs was an historical process involving freezing out of Mexican-Americans from "the more highly skilled occupations associated with newer technologies in rapidly expanding fields" (Hiestand 1964:114). Anglos entering the new industries, such as petroleum and metal fabricating that burgeoned in the Southwest during and after WWII, acquired their skills on the job so that it was not lack of training that made Chicanos unacceptable for these jobs (Schmidt 1970:9). Playing inconsequential roles in the building of new industries, the Spanish surnames of the Southwest were left with the lowest-paying jobs in the most static industries -- the garment trades, mining, textiles and so on. Furthermore, it is specifically the types of jobs that Chicanos hold that are eliminated by the advance of technology. Thousands of Chicano jobs were eliminated by mechanization in canneries and other food processing plants as well as in commercial agriculture. In urban areas, laundering and car washing, and other unskilled and, semiskilled jobs have disappeared (Galarza et. al. 1969:34).

Manpower policy has not only proved inadequate but there is evidence that current agency programs extend and perpetuate the manpower problem of Chicano society. This is true for several reasons: (1) Present programs provide mainly unskilled jobs rather than increasing the employment prospects of their clients, (2) many of the agencies they operate through actually impede Chicano efforts to aid themselves, and (3) the programs are based on a wrong analysis of the problem. These conclusions are consistent with national sample surveys and more detailed case studies. Main (1968), in his nationwide evaluation of manpower programs found that they were not

successful in raising incomes (also Thurow 1968).

Job creation and on-the-job training programs have proved ineffective. Many developed jobs with inadequate wages. Two-thirds of the positions created by the National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB) in fifteen cities in the first year of the heavily subsidized Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS) paid less than $2.00 an hour (Harrison 1972:2). In his study of Watts and East Los Angeles, a mainly Chicano area, Bullock (1973:32ff) found that job creation programs mainly offered jobs in custodial maintenance, low-level clerical fields and other unskilled and semi-skilled professions. Inability to place graduates into jobs for which they had been trained has meant that programs operate to maintain income rather than enhance skills (Briggs 1973; Bullock 1973). Although all future manpower trends point to an increasing predominance of white collar jobs in virtually every on-the-job training program in the Southeast, the Spanish surnamed "have been entered into training for blue collar production jobs at rates in excess of their share in the existing work forces (of the companies involved). But in the case of training for white collar jobs they are greatly underrepresented..." (Schmidt 1970:43).

Present programs not only do not aim at providing attractive work possibilites, but they are run through public agencies which have shown themselves incapable of implementing those aspects of the programs which might prove beneficial. Although the Employment Service and its rural counterpart, the Farm Labor Service, have been more concerned with meeting the needs of employers than serving interests of job seekers,[19] virtually every major manpower enactment has given the Employment Service or the Farm Labor Service a vital role in the recruitment and placement of workers (Bullock 1973:31;

Briggs 1973:68). The result has been that discriminatory practices have not ceased and that "public programs designed to promote (social) mobility in fact serve as a recruiting instrument for employers in the secondary labor market" (Harrison 1972). The Rural Manpower Service, in fact, was according to Briggs, accused of pervasive discrimination by a U.S. Department of Labor Report (1973:69). Detailing cases of rule evasion, the report observed, for example that in Texas

> "...when minority workers sought assistance from RMS they were only 'referred to the office handling employment without receiving any of the benefits of that office, such as testing, counseling, training...' Minority workers, regardless of skills or previous work experience, were offered only agricultural jobs" (Briggs 1973:69).

Public programs also suffer from an incorrect analysis of the employment problem of Chicanos and other non-white groups in that they assume that increasing the potential productivity of minority workers by increasing their education and participation in formal training programs, is the best method of improving their income and employment possibilities. However, educational requirements for jobs actually serve as a mechanism for screening out non-white workers. Employers use academic achievements as standards for many unskilled and semi-skilled occupations despite the fact that educational attainment as measured by years of schooling or achievement scores has been shown to be unrelated to variations in worker productivity in these jobs (Berg 1970; Gordon 1972:120). Moore points out that such unrealistic academic requirements "keep Mexicans out of many jobs for which they are qualified" (1972:62).

Moreover, Chicanos who have received manpower training and who are

better educated do not show significant returns to these investments. Indeed, there is little relationship between institutional training and income or occupational status for ghetto and barrio workers (Bullock 1973; Harrison 1972). While white unemployment rates fall with years of school completed, Chicano employment probability does not increase with education. The probability of unemployment for college trained Chicanos of San Antonio was actually 8 percent higher than for workers who never attended college at all. (Harrison 1972:83ff).

Rather than lack of education and training, institutional arrangements are the main barriers to Chicano employment. For instance, occupational stereotyping, the practice of assuming that members of a subordinate ethnic group are only capable of performing certain types of tasks, means that even qualified subordinate group members are not considered for better jobs. In the rural U.S., Chicanos are stereotyped as farm workers who may occupy only the lowest positions on the commercial farms (Madsen 1964; Flores 1973). Urban Chicanos are forced into jobs as garbage men, street sweepers, unskilled factory workers, all of whom receive the lowest wages for the least desirable jobs (Grebler et. al. 1970).

Just as they were historically prevented from entering the expanding prosperous fields, Chicanos today face the same set of exclusionary mechanisms in hiring, payment, and promotion. The excuse that there were no qualified Chicano applicants is often another device of exclusion.[20] A manpower policy based mainly on improving education and training, as are present programs, would prove a failure even if the jobs for which Chicanos were trained included those in the newer technological and rapidly expanding fields. Present programs, though, do not only fail to deal with institutional

barriers, but the jobs they develop are low paying and with little opportunity for advancement. They, thereby, help to ensure that a disproportionate number of Chicanos and other non-whites find work only in those industries where unemployment risks are high and where higher wages would have to be paid were whites to be employed (Goodpaster 1971: 351).

The Subeconomy

With few legal economic opportunities and even those of a dead-end variety, and with the poor returns to education and training that he receives, many Chicanos, like other non-whites, opt out for the "sub-economy" of street economic activities of gambling, drugs and the like (Bullock 1973; Harrison 1972). There is evidence that "the government and the larger society are active agents in tolerating and even encouraging the activities of the subeconomy (Bullock 1973:167). The subeconomy of crime yields high profits to national sector entrepreneurs, policemen and other public officials through a combination of business profits, graft and control of barrio and ghetto housing and business establishments (Bullock 1973:134ff). For example, while drug manufacturing firms have successfully lobbied against government regulation of tranquilizers and other drugs "it is clear that a large percent of pill production in this country finds its way into the subeconomy" (Bullock 1973:124). While bringing the major profits to drug companies and other members of the national society, the sub-economy throws the major burdens in terms of arrest records on Chicanos and other darker ethnics. It also provides some income for non-whites, thereby making it unnecessary for the national sector to widen lawful employment opportunities.

Agricultural Labor and Immigration Policy

The Chicano occupational and income possibilities are further harmed by agricultural employment policies and immigration policies. The latter enables both legal and illegal Mexican border crossers to gain employment in just those unskilled and semi-skilled positions in which Chicanos are concentrated.

Although the majority of Chicanos are urban dwellers, those that reside in rural areas have been inordinately employed as farm laborers in the Southwest (Briggs 1973:27). The large-scale, industrialized, commercial enterprises of immense financial capability that dominate Southwestern agriculture have not allowed Chicanos to influence decisions concerning their wages, working conditions or the laws covering them (Abt Associates 1970:4169; Briggs 1973:22; McWilliams 1969). Public policy has favored the farm owner at the expense of the rural labor force, the greatest percentage of whom are Chicanos, and helped to make farmworkers the most deprived sector of the national economy (Allen 1966; Shotwell 1961; U.S. Congress 1970; D. Wright 1969).

Farm operators in the Southwest have guaranteed themselves a surplus supply situation in the agricultural labor market either through official approval for the immigration of alien workers, illegal immigration or direct government aid in securing a temporary labor force (Elac 1961; Galarza 1964; Schmidt 1964). This surplus supply of labor is still maintained through the use of "green carders," (Mexican national who while admitted as permanent immigrants, retain their residence in Mexico), "white carders" (those border commuters who have a 72 hour permit), and illegal entrants. The following are notable among the ways in which public policy helps to perpetuate this

situation. Court decisions have allowed "green carders" to avoid the permanent residency requirement of the immigration statutes by equating "employment with residence;" the labor certification process that is supposed to verify that a shortage of workers exists before permitting the use of green carders is fraught with loopholes; although "white carders" are forbidden to work in the U.S., "the law is honored in the breach" (Briggs 1973:34); and employers in the Southwest and elsewhere are encouraged to use illegal entrants by immigration statutes which render employers immune from prosecution if they hire illegal aliens (see Briggs 1973:34ff for more details).

Although most of the commuters work in agriculture, almost one third find their way to other types of employment (North 1970). Thus, through institutional manipulation both urban and rural employers in the Southwest are guaranteed a pool of cheap labor which drives down wages and reduces employment opportunities for native residents, impedes Chicano union organization, and forces Southwestern Chicanos into the seasonal migratory work stream (Abt Associates 1970:4123; North 1970:2204). Immigration policies also exacerbate urban problems by adding to the streams of displaced agricultural laborers who migrate to the city to compete for the lowest status jobs (Fujimoto 1968; Goodpaster 1971). To further add to the woes of the rural Chicanos, almost all of whom are dependent on farm wage labor, farmworkers are excluded from almost all conventional social legislation such as unemployment coverage.

Educational Policy

Government programs to change the poor chicano educational profile

have actually had the contrary effect. This is partly because the educational system has acted in opposition to legal pronouncements, concerning such issues as suppressing the Spanish language and tracking. Public policies toward the education of Chicano youth also suffer mainly from incorrect goals. The aim of federal educational programs has been to correct alleged culture and personality deficiencies in the child (Brisehetto and Arciniega 1973:40). Like manpower programs, they fail because they do not deal with the external restraints which are the Chicano's chief impediment.

Even the bilingual programs funded under Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1968 are primarily forms of compensatory education, aimed at improving clients by promoting their adequate command of English (Edwards 1976:70). Although studies of earlier ESEA programs found that state and local agencies failed to implement them properly by not providing educational and supportive services or by failing to comply with official guidelines (Wargo et al. 1972; Steiner 1970:221), there has been little evaluation of the present programs (Edwards 1976:77; Uranga 1973:171). The latter do not have any provision for dealing with state and local agency lack of compliance. Yet, as D.C. Wright et. al. (1973:59) warn:

> "There is little likelihood that Mexican-american youth in substantial numbers can advance through a college education until language problems can be overcome. And ther is equally little chance that these language difficulties will be overcome if educational systems continue to resist bilingual programs as they have done."

Summing up, public programs in both their formal and enforcement aspects tend to maintain Chicanos as a subordinate and excluded sector of society. Rather than combatting discriminatory hiring, payment and promotion, government manpower, educational, immigration and agricultural labor policy secure

employers in low wage industries of the Southwest a steady supply of Chicano workers who are unable to refuse ill-paying, low status and unstable jobs.

ADAPTIVE RESPONSES

We have already explored some of the responses that Chicanos have made to their colonial status, including participation in the economy of crime, the attempt on the part of individuals to assimilate by giving up their ethnic identity, and the formation of a Chicano third party, the LRU. This section further examines the adaptive reaction of Chicanos to the hostility of the greater society.

Among the strategies adopted by Chicanos have been attempts to enter unions which contain Anglos. Yet here, as in other aspects of life, cleavages exist between Chicanos and the national sector, often within the same labor institution (Rosales 1975:273). Nelson Cisneros (1975:260), for instance, notes that the Anglo organized movement in San Antonio and Laredo excluded Chicanos from union activities in the 1920 to 1940 period. The labor unions in Los Angeles that organized in those industries which employed large numbers of unskilled workers, by necessity, organized Chicano workers who made up a significant portion of the work force in those industries (Arroyo 1975:299). However, after 1943 Chicanos lost their access to the CIO Council Committees, and efforts to resolve Chicano problems within the CIO structure became increasingly unfruitful.

Chicanos also have established unions whose membership has been almost totally Chicano, a strategy very prominent among Mexican American agricultural

workers (Jamieson 1945, McWilliams 1969). Meeting with violent grower reaction, this adaptation has been invariably unsuccessful until the recent victories of the United Farm Workers Union.

Sociopolitical Responses[21]

Although stereotyped as politically apathetic, Chicanos have engaged in a wide range of sociopolitical adaptations. These range from the rebellions that swept through the Southwest in the second half of the nineteenth century to the contemporary movements for ethnic pride and Brown Power. The political indifference that did occur, characterized by alienation and feelings of helplessness, was not a result of Mexican culture, but was induced by economic privation and sociopolitical restrictions (De la Garza 1973:100).

Before 1900, ethnic organizations faced open oppression (as in Texas) or were limited because of the sparcity of the Chicano population. Beginning in the 1900's, a small Mexican-American middle class established organizations of a multifunctional nature masking their political aspect. An example is the Alianza Hispano Americano which, over a 60 year period, has acted to provide insurance benefits as well as to advocate Civil Rights programs in the 1950's.

The urbanization and participation in the armed forces that came with WWII, resulted in an expanded Chicano political effort. The G.I. Forum, organized in Texas in 1948, took up the fight against segregation in the schools, restaurants and movie theaters. The Community Service Organization (CSO), established through alliances with Anglos in the labor movement and religious leaders, in contrast to earlier organization, called for partici-

pation by all elements of the Chicano community, and attempted to turn out the Mexican-American vote (Moore 1970b:146).

Late in the 1950's, a new type of organization appeared, dedicated to putting Chicanos into political office. Both the Mexican American Political Association, founded in California, and the Political Association of Spanish Speaking Organizations (PASSO) of Texas are examples. Although they gained some legal and political successes, MAPA and PASSO did not begin to attack the economic and social exclusion of the Chicano population.

Only after 1965 did a Chicano movement emerge which began to address itself to the entire range of problems facing the Mexican-American Community. Realizing that civil equality by itself could not bring meaningful socio-economic relief, the Chicano movement has rejected assimilation for the aims of collective socioeconomic advance and sociocultural self-determination. It encompasses a wide range of political action, from those who feel that working in the two party system and other traditional forms of political participation are the least effective means, to those, who like the Brown Berets, endorse active self-defense. Ethnic pride also has been a facet of the Chicano movement. Chicanos have established their own publishing outlets, exposed the distortions of many Anglo social scientists who have overlooked Chicano political agressiveness, and pressed for inclusion of bilingual education and Chicano history in school curriculum.

FUTURE PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS

Chicanos used to be known as the "Forgotten Minority." With the upsurge of militancy in the 1960's, Mexican-Americans have gained the attention of official agencies. Having been "discovered," however, does

not, in itself, guarantee that the status of the Chicano community will change from that of an internal colony. This section examines evidence over the past ten to twenty years that the mechanisms of dominance-subordinance have been altered. Then, a review is made of the type of governmental programs that are needed to eliminate the subordinate socioeconomic situation of Chicanos and the kinds of programs that will not be beneficial. Finally, this section explores the likelihood that courses of action will be instituted to incorporate socioeconomically the Chicano segment into the national society.

Alterations in the Mechanisms of Dominance

The trend in the mechanisms of dominance has been away from outright legal barriers toward more subtle types of mechanisms. In the past 10 to 20 years, Chicanos have attained a much greater extent of legal equality, with litigation formally removing the barrier of tracking as well as the voting restrictions of poll taxes and literacy tests. However, public agencies have defeated legal pronouncements by not carrying out directives. In addition, the dominant society has moved to change the rules of the game and claimed that, since civic equality has been achieved, all problems are at an end.

As whites flee in greater numbers to the suburbs, the darker ethnic groups threaten to gain political control of the urban core areas. Whites have aimed to minimize their losses by two different strategies. One involves metropolitan reorganization which, through expansion of city boundaries to include suburban white communities, would retain Anglo numerical majorities.

The other aims to change taxing structure to favor the suburban areas (Ornelas et. al. 1975:27).

Some have also proclaimed that formal equality means the end of the problem of the "non-white" ethnics, or, at least, that government can do nothing further to aid the darker poor. In fact, attempts to apply policies to promote Chicano and other "non-white" entrance into higher occupational categories, good housing, and university training are labelled "Affirmative Discrimination" (see Glazer 1975).

Governmental Programs

While Chicano elective political representation has been on the increase, important socioeconomic indices point toward a heightening of the internal colonial process. The recent inflation has differentially hurt Chicanos, throwing many out of work. Rising food prices by 1974 had brought the price of beans, the staple of the Chicano poor, very nearly to that of a cheap hamburger. The higher cost of gasoline has meant many Chicanos could not afford to travel long distances to work (Moore 1975:74). Unemployment and underemployment are clearly a chronic condition of a large portion of Chicano teenagers and young adults, impervious to economic recovery, and approaching catastrophic dimensions. Indicating that in the future Chicanos will remain frozen out of the promising, advancing industries is the inability of the Chicano segment to keep up with the national occupational trend toward white collar positions.

The implication of these trends for government is that an explicit economic development policy is desperately needed (Harrison 1972:151). With unemployment at such high levels and with the existing barriers to

their employment, only programs which create large numbers of jobs, and which guarantee opportunities for Chicanos and other non-whites can eliminate their employment deficiencies (Gordon 1972; Bullock 1973). These jobs must be stable and offer reasonable pay, chances for promotion, and other benefits. At the same time, severe penalties against entrepreneurs employing illegal aliens should be written into the law and border crossing permits should be restricted (Samore 1971:142ff).

An examination of other policy approaches shows how inadequate and even detrimental they may be. These other directions include the remedial approach, the approach of "benign neglect," and the attempt to use education as the main means to improve the situation. The effort to combat inflation while allowing an extraordinarily high rate of unemployment to continue unabated among the Chicano population typifies "benign neglect" programs. Looking to fiscal policy to generate economic recovery in the hope that benefits will trickle down to the poor is unrealistic, given the resistance of poverty to the economic prosperity of the 1960's (see, for example, Kelly 1970). Suggestions like those of Milton Friedman that the barrio and ghetto employment situation can be improved by doing away with minimum wage legislation demonstrate a critical lack of understanding of the problem. Friedman (1970) claims that employers are forced not to hire barrio and ghetto employees because minimum wages are above what these people are worth on the market. However, authors have demonstrated that many of the inner city inhabitants opt out of constant employment at the menial legal jobs available to them because wages are too low at the prevailing minimum wages. (See Bullock 1973; Harrison 1972, for example). Lowering wages can only intensify the problem.

Policies of a remedial or "care-taken" nature also are, at best, clearly inadequate. Welfare and food stamps merely support the Chicano population in its subordinate status and are an implicit subsidy of employers in the secondary labor market.

The educational system is incapable of solving the Chicano socio-economic problems. Even if it were operating so as to provide Mexican-Americans with as good an education as Anglos, Chicanos with the same educational background as Anglos still hold poorer jobs and receive lower wages. While much of the present federal educational policy is directed toward desegregating the schools, ability grouping and inadequate handling of Chicano language distinctions continue. An example of a totally misguided governmental educational effort is the recent decision to assign Los Angeles teachers by a lottery system. Its effect, if implemented, would be to destroy the few bilingual education projects that have been set up in Los Angeles by switching the specially trained bilingual teachers to other schools.

Colonized and Colonizer

Despite the need for new courses of action, the public policy prognosis is for more "benign neglect" or remedial type programs. While a few Chicanos may be added to policy making boards, the Chicano political voice will remain small. Anglos will stifle darker ethnic control of urban areas through metropolitan reorganization or changing the tax structure to benefit the Anglo suburbs.While Chicanos may take over political offices in local towns, as the LRU has done, Anglos will retain control of all the prominent institutions such as the major economic enterprises and the

sources of funding. In addition, the traditional route followed by European ethnics of developing power at the local level first is not as feasible as it was earlier because both state and federal guidelines as well as the Civil Service now limit local government control of policy in bureaucracies (Moore 1975:148). Finally, a few more Chicano representatives in Congress or in the Federal bureaucracies cannot have a fundamental effect on the structure of dominance. Their numbers will be too small and their positions too tenuous to open Chicano access to participation in policy making.

Public policy, remaining in the hands of the Anglo sector, will continue to be applied differentially. It will still operate to limit Chicano employment opportunities and to open our Southern border to a flood of illegal aliens and legal commuters. The mechanisms of internal colonialism will assure that Chicanos remain a cheap labor source. Only fundamental reforms, going far beyond school desegregation, can alter this situation.

Notes

1. The terms Chicanos and Mexican Americans are used interchangeably in this report.

2. For a discussion of the differences in the incorporation of various regions of the Southwest and the modern consequences, see J. Moore, 1970. "Colonialism" The Case of Mexican Americans. Social Problems, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring), pp. 463-472.

3. Unless otherwise noted, Anglo = White -Spanish surnamed.

4. The term Anglo, in this case, is used as an equivalent for the "white" category as used by the Census Bureau. The Census Bureau uses the "white" category to include all persons of Spanish surname. Thus well over 95 percent of Chicanos and Puerto Ricans are classified as "white." This means that income figures for "whites" are lower than they would be if the white category did not contain the Spanish surnamed.

5. The figures used for 1960 and 1974 are not strictly comparable: while the 1960 figure represents the ratio of incomes of Spanish surname families in the Southwest to that of Anglos in the Southwest, the 1974 figure is the ratio of incomes of Mexican origin families in the United States to that of Anglo families in the entire country.

6. The Spanish origin category also includes Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and South Americans.

7. Note also that in order for the white percent of white collar jobs to remain constant while the Chicano proportion is growing, one or more of the other groups that make up the "white" category would have to experience a decline in the proportion of its employed holding white collar jobs.

8. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. "Minority-owned Businesses: Spanish Origin." 1972 Survey of Minority-owned Business Enterprises. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Special Report MB 72-2 (Table 7) Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1974. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (Table No. 783, p 489) Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975. "The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1974." Special Studies. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (Table No. 808, p. 492) Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office.

9. The native born of native born include descendants of colonial stock going back to the 16th century. Most of the latter live in Colorado and New Mexico, but by far the largest proportion of native born of native born -- over 81 percent -- reside in California and Texas (See U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1974. A Study of Selected Socio-Economic Characteristics of Minorities Based on the 1970 Census, Vol. I: Americans of Spanish Origin (Table 1-2, p4). Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

10. See U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1974. ibid (Table E-1, p. 63); and J. Moore, 1975. Mexican Americans, 2nd edition (Table 4-1, p. 64). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall.

11. This last point will be covered more fully in the following section on Mechanisms of Internal Colonialism.

12. Colorado Commission on Spanish-surnamed Citizens, 1967. "The Status of Spanish-surnamed Citizens in Colorado." Report to the Colorado General Assembly (p. 98) Denver, Colorado.

13. The standard used for overcrowding is more than one person per room.

14. J. Moore, 1975. op.cit. (Table 8-1, p. 140). Moore notes that Chicanos fare better in terms of those who voted as a percentage of those registered to vote. These figures are 81.5% for Chicanos, 80% for Blacks, and 86% for Irish.

15. U.S. Congress, 1973. Hearings on the Activities of the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-speaking People. 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Committee on Government Operations, July 23 and September 12 (p. 42) Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

16. The committee was renamed the "Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish Speaking People" in 1969.

17. International City Management Association, 1976. The Municipal Yearbook, 1976. Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association.

18. This section depends heavily on Barrera et. al., 1972. "The Barrio as an Internal Colony" in H.H. Hahn (ed.), People and Politics in Urban Society, Urban Affairs Annual Review, Vol. 6, pp. 465-498. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

19. For more details concerning the Federally funded network of farm labor offices, see D. Janson, 1972. "Many Farm Labor Offices Favor Growers." In R. Gomez (ed.), The Changing Mexican-American, pp. 90-105. Boulder, Colorado: Pruett Publishing Co. Janson concludes that the entire sum of the program of farm labor offices is to give growers a free tax supported service.

20. For a discussion of how such justifications work to freeze out Chicanos from publishing and other academic pursuits see C. Ornelas et. al., 1975. Decolonizing the Interpretation of the Chicano Political Experience, Los Angeles: Chicano Studies Center, Pamphlet Series No. 2.

21. This section depends heavily on J. Moore, 1975. op.cit. (Chapter 8).

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